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ABSTRACT 
 
In this dissertation, I integrate signaling and holistic processing theories to 
examine how the pattern characteristics of a target firm’s competitive actions over time 
can influence its acquisition premium by reducing information asymmetry. Currently, 
our knowledge of acquisitions and accompanying premiums is dominated by acquirers’ 
concerns and little is known about how a target firm can influence its value in the eyes of 
potential buyers. Signaling theory has been used to help examine this issue, but overall 
applications have remained similar and largely cross-sectional in nature. My research 
builds on signaling theory and holistic processing theory to suggest patterns in a firm’s 
competitive action repertoire provide current and historical information that can reduce 
information asymmetries for potential acquirers.  
Specifically, I develop theory to predict that target firms with competitive action 
repertoires exhibiting high simplicity, similarity, and predictability will be associated 
with high acquisition premiums. I also consider both firm and environmental level 
characteristics that may potentially moderate these relationships. My results support the 
underlying assertion in my model, that competitive action repertoire characteristics 
influence acquisition premiums; but, I find conflicting effects depending on the specific 
characteristics. Further, I do not find any support for my proposed moderating effects. 
Theoretical and empirical implications of the research are discussed.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Zip2 and Broadcast.com are companies with scant brand recognition today. 
However, this is not the case for the firms’ respective cofounders, Elon Musk with Zip2 
and Mark Cuban of Broadcast.com, who remain two of the most widely-known 
entrepreneurs. Both successfully executed a highly-profitable exit by first preparing their 
firms to be highly coveted acquisition targets and second, successfully obtaining a 
substantial premium over the market price when the sale was completed. While the 
building and managing of the businesses generated shareholder wealth, the founders' 
ability to extract a high premium from the buyer is perhaps what truly cemented Musk 
and Cuban as icons for aspiring entrepreneurs. Indeed, as these examples illustrate, 
acquisitions are a viable and profitable strategy for many entrepreneurs seeking an exit 
(Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004). However, how successful such an exit is for an 
entrepreneur depends largely on the premium captured in the sale. 
An acquisition premium, commonly referred to simply as a premium, refers to 
the price paid for a target firm that is above the firm’s pre-acquisition market value (Hitt 
et al., 2012). Currently in the management literature, our knowledge of the driving forces 
behind acquisition premiums is dominated by buyer concerns of overpayment (Coff, 
1999; Hitt et al., 2012; Sirower, 1997). Indeed, little is known about how a target firm 
can increase its value in the eyes of potential buyers.  
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Current evidence suggests that while highly subjective, premiums are largely 
driven by anticipated synergies on the part of the acquirer (Hitt et al., 2012). The 
justification for high acquisition premiums is largely based on the potential synergy that 
can be achieved, which can take two broad forms: (i) the potential for greater operational 
efficiencies and/or (ii) the potential for financial benefits (Nielsen & Melicher, 1973). 
Research has used the resource based view (RBV) (Barney 1986; 1991; Dierickx & 
Cool, 1989) to expand on these concepts, finding that acquiring firms create synergy by 
capitalizing on the complementary assets of the acquired firm to produce valuable and 
unique products and services, to generate economics of scale and scope, to eliminate 
inefficiencies in value chains, and to redeploy resources to more effective or efficient 
uses, thereby improving the firm’s competitive advantage (Hitt et al., 2012). 
The variability in assessments of such potential synergies, and thus the value of 
the target firm, is primarily due to information asymmetries in the acquisitions market. 
Information asymmetries occur when one actor has more complete or better information 
than others due to the imperfect flow of information (Hayek, 1945). Initially proposed in 
the field of economics through the example of used car “lemons” (Akerlof, 1970), in an 
acquisition market, target firms face significant obstacles in realizing gains due to 
information asymmetry about (i) the target’s quality of assets, (ii) what can be 
transferred to a buying firm, and (iii) potential synergy between the companies (Coff, 
1999).  In other words, because target firms’ resources and capabilities can be difficult 
for buyers to clearly identify and value (Heeley, Matusik, & Jain, 2007; Sanders & 
Boivie, 2004), target firms often face premium discounting (Reuer, Tong, & Wu, 2012).  
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Thus, in order to reduce acquisition premium discounting and receive the highest 
premium possible, it is in the best interest of a high quality target firm to reduce 
information asymmetries and distinguish itself from low quality, or “lemon” firms for 
the buyer. Generally, in management research, the notion of quality refers to “the 
underlying, unobservable ability of the [firm] to fulfill the needs or demands of an 
outsider” (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011: 43). While maintaining 
information asymmetries may be in the interest of low quality firms, continued buyer 
discounting due to previous “lemon” purchases motivates high quality firms to 
distinguish themselves from others in order to avoid discounting and receive the highest 
premium possible. Beginning with work in the labor markets (Spence, 1973), signaling 
theory provides a mechanism for reducing information asymmetries between two parties 
(Connelly et al., 2011). Coff (2002) suggested that signaling can be applied to the M&A 
market, finding that acquiring firms can rely on signals to avoid hazards such as adverse 
selection.   
Recently, work in this stream has found that engaging in costly and observable 
signals that distinguish high quality from low quality firms is a strong method for 
reducing information asymmetries by target firms (Ragozzino & Reuer, 2011). For 
example, Reuer and colleagues (2012) found that inter-organizational relationships, such 
as associations with investment banks, venture capitalists, and alliance partners, can 
reduce acquirers’ offer price discounting due to information asymmetries. However, 
while the use of inter-organizational relationships, including the use of relationships with 
M&A market intermediaries such as investment banks, may help reduce uncertainties 
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regarding the quality of the target (Coff, 1999), these relationships do little to reduce 
uncertainties regarding what resources could be transferred and what potential synergies 
might exist between the target and the potential acquirer.  In other words, while these 
signals are important indicators to distinguish quality firms from “lemons” in the market, 
they do not provide useful information regarding internal resources and potential 
synergistic gains.  
 Further, in such previous work little to no concern is given to the target firm’s 
difficulties in engaging in signaling due to its conflicting needs to reduce information 
asymmetries in the market while simultaneously protecting its proprietary knowledge 
and sources of competitive advantage from imitation by competitors (Ndofor & Levitas, 
2004). Specifically, while engaging in interorganizational relationships may reduce 
uncertainties, they expose the target firm to considerable risk from knowledge spillovers. 
Thus, a target firm faces a paradox: it needs to signal information about its internal 
resource transformation to reduce information asymmetries and premium discounting 
while simultaneously protecting its competitive position and guarding its proprietary 
knowledge.  
Competitive actions are observable, externally directed, specific moves initiated 
by a firm to achieve desired objectives (Smith, Grimm, Gannon, & Chen, 1991) and 
have been found to convey information about a firm’s intentions, characteristics, and 
resources (Basdeo, Smith, Grimm, Rindova, & Derfus, 2006). While commonly split 
into two categories, strategic and tactical, competitive actions of all types are necessary 
for a firm to maintain its competitive position and can potentially signal diverse 
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information about a firm’s resources and capabilities. Therefore, most competitive 
dynamics research considers a broad range of competitive actions from pricing to 
partnerships when evaluating the influence of a firm’s competitive strategy (e.g. Ferrier, 
2001; Smith et al., 1991).  
However, while competitive actions are costly and observable, both of which are 
necessary characteristics of signals (Connelly et al., 2011), they are potentially difficult 
for prospective buyers to interpret and understand. This difficulty is heightened at the 
corporate level of analysis relevant for the M&A market because of the sheer volume 
and diversity of actions undertaken, coupled with the possible inability for buyers to 
interpret long-term strategic intentions from single strategic or tactical “snap-shots” 
(Davila, Foster, & Gupta, 2003). For these reasons, competitive actions taken across a 
firm are potentially strong signals but they are subject to a significant amount of noise. 
However, if strategic and tactical competitive actions are considered over time in the 
form of a competitive repertoire, as opposed to single instances, patterns or gestalt 
properties become apparent.  
A gestalt property refers to an organized whole that is perceived as more than the 
sum of its parts. Such characteristics represent “the general quality or character of 
something” (Merriam-Webster, 2014).  Examples of gestalt properties of competitive 
repertoires include competitive simplicity, similarity, and predictability (Ferrier, 2001; 
Rindova, Ferrier, & Wiltbank, 2010). Such gestalt properties of competitive repertories 
may serve as powerful signals in part because it would likely be prohibitively expensive 
for an organization to mismatch its internal resource transformations with competitive 
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actions, especially in the long run. These gestalt signals can thus potentially reduce 
information asymmetries and protect proprietary sources of competitive advantage for a 
target firm in an acquisition market.  
Sensemaking theory and research on gestalt properties in psychology suggest that 
holistic or global patterns and properties are important signals (i.e., they are costly and 
observable, Connelly et al., 2011) that are naturally perceived and interpreted (Weick, 
1995; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008), and are not present in the component parts of the 
signal (Rindova et al., 2010). Gestalt properties influence evaluations because they 
integrate the disparate parts of a sequence into a perceived whole, thus increasing the 
processing fluency and ease of interpretation of the stimulus (Mishra, Mishra, & 
Nayakankuppam, 2006). By increasing processing fluency, gestalt properties have been 
found to consistently increase positive evaluations across a broad range of receivers (Lee 
& Labroo, 2004). In other words, considering the complexity of the information being 
conveyed, gestalt characteristics of action sequences are costly and observable signals 
that can convey important information independent of the individual competitive action 
signals. As a signal, these gestalt properties convey information to a broad audience of 
potential acquirers by increasing processing fluency and ease of understanding. Thus, the 
value of repertoire gestalt characteristics to target firms is not in communicating with a 
single potential buyer, but in creating broad attractiveness of the target by reducing 
information asymmetries to multiple potential acquirers.  
Building from these arguments, I integrate the recent work on competitive 
repertoires with work in acquisition premiums by suggesting that competitive repertoire 
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gestalt characteristics at a firm’s corporate level signal valuable information about the 
transformation of internal resources over time to create value, while simultaneously 
protecting a target’s competitive position. I suggest that this information about internal 
resources and transformation processes influences acquisition premiums by reducing 
uncertainties regarding transferability of resources and potential synergies between the 
target firm and multiple potential acquiring firms, thereby creating competitive pressure 
for the buyers. Thus, the primary research question in this dissertation is “How can 
target firms reduce information asymmetries and raise their acquisition premium 
through signaling gestalt characteristics of competitive action repertoires to multiple 
potential buyers?” My secondary research question seeks to understand the boundary 
conditions of the signaling value of gestalt properties by asking “How does the salience 
of gestalt properties of competitive action repertoires change based on buyer 
characteristics and environmental conditions?”  
In this work, I seek to integrate competitive action repertoires and acquisition 
premiums with signaling theory to identify how buyers and sellers overcome information 
asymmetries. This study makes three primary contributions. First, my work extends 
signaling theory by suggesting that gestalt characteristics of action or signal sequences 
are costly and observable signals that can convey important information independent of 
the individual signals. My work builds on previous research (Rindova et al., 2010) by 
exploring how targets can reduce uncertainty about their value through complex 
signaling sequences. 
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Second, previous work on acquisition premiums has focused on environmental 
conditions (Nathan & O’Keefe, 1989; Shelton, 2000), upper echelon characteristics 
(Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Hitt, Ireland, & Harrison, 2001), compensation design 
(Datta, Iskandar-Datta, & Raman, 2001; Slusky & Caves, 1991), network influences 
(Beckman & Haunschild, 2002; Haunschild, 1994), and agency issues with 
intermediaries (Porrini, 2006; Stouraitis, 2003). However, it has not considered the 
impact of a target firm’s current corporate-level competitive strategies on buyer 
evaluations and acquisition premiums. I integrate work on competitive repertoires from 
competitive dynamics as signals in M&A markets in order to address this gap in our 
understanding of acquisition premiums. 
Third, competitive dynamics has focused on understanding the drivers of 
competitive action/reaction and in turn, firm performance. However, research on other 
outcomes has been limited. I aim to extend competitive dynamics by introducing another 
important outcome of competitive strategies: acquisition premiums. Similarly, focusing 
on sequences of competitive actions, or action repertoires, has been gaining popularity in 
competitive dynamics in the past decade (Ferrier, 2001; Ndofor, Sirmon, & He, 2011). 
Current evidence suggests that repertoire characteristics of simplicity, conformity, and 
predictability are negatively related to firm performance (Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm, 
1999; Miller & Chen, 1996a; Miller & Chen, 1996b; Ndofor et al., 2011). However, I 
suggest these characteristics may increase acquisition premiums for two main reasons. 
First, because they increase processing fluency on the part of the buyer through pattern 
perception resulting in more positive evaluations by multiple potential buyers evidenced 
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by higher premiums. Second, because they are costly signals that convey unique 
information regarding a target firm’s internal resource transformation activities that, in 
turn, reduce information asymmetries regarding resource transferability and potential 
synergies to multiple prospective acquiring firms. Thus, this work explores the 
alternative consequences of repertoire characteristics on a target firm’s financial 
outcomes.  
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CHAPTER II 
CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
Information Asymmetries in Acquisition Premiums 
Information asymmetries exist when one party in a market has more and/or better 
information than another party. Examples of such information disparities in transactions 
include when a borrower knows more about its creditworthiness than a lender, a person 
knows more about his or her medical conditions and prospects than an insurance 
company, and, most famously, a seller knows more about a used car than the buyer 
(Akerlof, 1970). All of these examples can be characterized not only by differences in 
the amount of information between the two parties, but also by the purchasing party’s 
inability to understand and accurately value what the seller is offering.  
Broadly, information asymmetries are caused by the imperfect diffusion of 
knowledge in the market. Because knowledge is dispersed by people, places and time, an 
individual actor is unlikely to know all possible information about specific opportunities 
(Hayek, 1945). Building from this, Hayek (1945) challenged economic tradition by 
rejecting the assumption that all actors have equal and instantaneous access to 
information. Instead, he suggested that knowledge spreads across a market such that no 
two individuals possess the same stock of knowledge, information, or interpretations of 
the environment at a point in time. Despite this early work and the well-known 
imperfections of knowledge and information in a market, work in economics continued 
to assume either perfect information or that markets with minor imperfections in 
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information would behave very similarly. This tradition began to significantly change 
with the work of a number of economists devoted to understanding the extent to which 
imperfect information influences decision making and market behavior, leading to the 
2001 Nobel Prize for Goerge Akerlof, Michael Spence, and Joseph Stiglitz. Combined, 
these works became the foundation for the new economics of information which 
suggests that information is imperfect, obtaining information can be costly, important 
information asymmetries exist, and the extent of asymmetries can be affected by both 
individuals and firms (Stiglitz, 2000).  
Overall, research has suggested two broad types of information where asymmetry 
is particularly salient. The first type of information is about intent and the second type is 
information about quality (Stiglitz, 2000). In the first category, most research on 
behavior and behavioral intentions in management has focused on using incentives as 
mechanisms for reducing potential moral hazards. Agency theory has largely been 
focused on this area by suggesting that principals and agents act in their own self-interest 
which may or may not be aligned with one another and that by aligning interests through 
incentives, hazards are reduced (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & 
Dalton, 2007).  
Regarding the second type of information asymmetries, research about latent and 
unobservable quality has also received considerable attention in contexts such as IPO 
evaluations (Certo, 2003), investor expectations (Park & Mezias, 2005; Schijven & Hitt, 
2012), international subsidiary behavior (Crilly, Zollo, & Hansen, 2012), and 
acquisitions (Coff, 2002). Of the many contexts where information asymmetries about 
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latent and unobservable quality have been a focus, the context of acquisitions remains an 
active area. Specifically within the topic of acquisitions, information asymmetries 
present an interesting paradox: despite research consistently finding a negative 
relationship between acquisition premiums and acquirer firm performance (Hitt et al., 
2012; Krishnan, Hitt, & Park, 2007), firms are often willing to pay substantial premiums 
in order to acquire target firms’ resources and capabilities with the highest premiums 
being paid to acquire firms in technology-intensive sectors (Laamanen, 2007; Zhu, 
2013).  
With the overarching justification for high acquisition premiums being based on 
potential synergy gains between a the buyer and the target (Hitt et al., 2012; Sirower, 
1997), the acquisition market is subject to considerable information asymmetries and 
adverse selection problems that can lead to offer discounting for a target firm (Coff, 
1999; Reuer et al., 2012). For example, acquirers usually possess less accurate 
information about the quality and value of a target’s assets than the target firm does, and 
this information asymmetry creates uncertainty about the evaluation of the target (Reuer 
et al., 2012; Zaheer, Hernandez, & Banerjee, 2010). In fact, this information asymmetry 
and accompanying uncertainty can create a “market of lemons” where firms of poor 
quality are difficult to distinguish from firms of high quality (Akerlof, 1970). 
Specifically, target firms face challenges in realizing high premiums due to acquirers’ 
uncertainty about (i) the target’s quality of assets, (ii) what can be transferred to a buying 
firm in an acquisition, and (iii) potential synergy between companies which results in 
offer discounting by the potential buyers (Coff, 1999).  
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In summary, the presence of information asymmetries in an acquisition market 
creates difficulties in evaluating a variety of aspects ex ante in a transaction, including 
intentions of both parties, latent and unobservable quality of the target firm, and the 
evaluation of the transferability and potential synergy of the target firm’s resources and 
capabilities which in turn results in premium offer discounting for the target firm (Coff, 
1999; Stiglitz, 2000). However, signaling theory provides a mechanism for firms to 
alleviate information asymmetries by conveying information to one another through 
costly and observable signals (Connelly et al. 2011; Spence 1973). Specifically, in 
acquisitions, target firms can engage in specific actions to reduce uncertainties about the 
firm and thus increase premiums (e.g. Reuer et al., 2012). In the next section, I introduce 
the basic tenets of signaling theory and highlight research related to its use in 
acquisitions and premiums.  
 
Signaling Theory 
 Developed from early works in information asymmetries (Akerlof, 1970; Hayek, 
1945), signaling theory is broadly concerned with the behavior of two parties (either 
individuals or organizations) in which the parties have differential information (Connelly 
et al., 2011). Specifically, signaling theory explains the use of costly and observable 
actions to convey information and reduce asymmetries between two parties. While this 
logic is somewhat intuitive, the theory’s contribution is in capturing the information 
aspect of market structures and the related cost of acquiring information (Connelly et al., 
2011). In other words, the value of the theory lies not in recognizing information 
 14 
 
asymmetries in a market and participants’ desire to reduce them, but instead in 
describing the actions and costs of conveying and receiving information.  
Spence (1973) first proposed signaling theory in the context of labor markets by 
suggesting that hiring is an example of an investment under conditions of uncertainty. 
He demonstrated how job applicants can engage in behaviors that reduce the information 
asymmetries between applicants and recruiters that impede the capability of prospective 
employers to make effective hiring decisions. Specifically, Spence (1973) suggested that 
high-quality applicants can distinguish themselves from lower quality applicants by 
engaging in the costly and observable action of obtaining a higher education degree. He 
suggested this action was taken by applicants to signal their unobservable quality as 
candidates to the hiring managers. The key to the success of a signal, in this case higher 
education, is the reliability of it to differentiate high and low quality actors because it is 
inherently too costly or difficult for lower quality actors to mimic. In other words, higher 
quality job applicants are able to withstand the rigors of education whereas lower quality 
applicants are unlikely to be able to do so. This differentiation ability of a signal is 
referred to as creating a separating equilibrium and it enables outsiders to accurately 
distinguish between high- and low-quality firms. If a signal is not able to differentiate 
firms, then it results in a pooling equilibrium that inhibits outsiders from being able to 
distinguish between the two types of firms (Cadsby, Frank, & Maksimovic, 1990; 
Connelly et al., 2011). Thus, a signal is only useful as a differentiator when the cost is 
sufficiently high in order to create an incentive for high quality actors to engage in it and 
a disincentive for low quality actors to engage in the signal.  
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The notion of quality and its assessment has been the basis of most signaling 
theory models since its inception by Spence (1973). However, quality can be interpreted 
in a wide variety of ways and contexts (Connelly et al., 2011). For example, while 
quality in Spence’s example refers to the unobservable ability of an applicant, in Ross’s 
(1973) work, quality refers to the ability of a firm to earn positive future cash flows. 
Often, the notion of quality is also closely related to terms such as reputation (Fischer & 
Reuber, 2007), legitimacy (Cohen & Dean, 2005), or prestige (Certo, 2003). In general, 
in management research, quality refers to “the underlying, unobservable ability of the 
signaler to fulfill the needs or demands of an outsider observing the signal” (Connelly et 
al 2011: 43).  
Signaling theory has been used broadly in management research, though most of 
the studies can be grouped into either a “strategy” or “entrepreneurship” category based 
on their context (Connelly et al., 2011). In start-up, young, and IPO firms, signals 
ranging from board structure and prestige (Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2001; Certo 2003), 
venture capital financing events (Davila et al., 2003), TMT composition and 
heterogeneity (Higgins & Gulati, 2006; Zimmerman, 2008), and founder- and insider-
ownership (Busenitz, Fiet, & Moesel, 2005; Jain, Jayaraman, & Kini, 2008) have all 
been found to reduce uncertainty about the quality of the firm to a variety of receivers, 
though the primary focus is potential investors. In more established firms, the receiver 
tends to be more varied, including stakeholders (Deephouse, 2000), shareholders 
(Goranova, Alessandri, Brandes, & Dharwadkar, 2007; Kang, 2008; Zhang & Wiersema, 
2009), consumers (Chung & Kalnins, 2001), investors (Lee, 2001; Park & Mezias, 
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2005), and competitors (McGrath & Nerker, 2004), causing signals about underlying 
firm quality to also range more broadly. However, a majority of studies focus on a few 
types of signals, namely advertising, press releases, and reputation building (Carter, 
2006; Chung & Kalnins, 2001; Coff, 2002; Deephouse, 2000), firm governance 
characteristics including CEOs (Zhang & Wiersema, 2009), board of directors (Kang, 
2008; Miller & Triana, 2009), and ownership (Goranova et al., 2007).  
In the past five years, strategy research on signaling has begun to explore the 
importance of inter-organizational ties including alliances and association memberships 
as a signal of quality for a variety of signalers including IPO firms (Reuer et al., 2013), 
private equity operators (Balboa & Marti, 2007), and young firms (Gulati & Higgins, 
2003). Specifically, work by Reuer and colleagues suggests that firms associated with 
more reputable investment banks and venture capitalists are more likely to be acquired  
(Reuer & Ragozzino, 2012) and can enhance their own position in an interorganizational 
network (Ozmel, Reuer, & Gulati, 2013). Additionally, Reuer et al. (2012) found that 
these types of interorganizational ties can also increase premiums for a target firm in an 
acquisition.  
While the history of interorganizational relationships with outside parties by 
targets prior to an acquisition can act as a signal of quality, an alternative explanation 
exists. Specifically, instead of the target’s relationships acting as a signal, it could be that 
third party firms with ties to both parties act as information brokers (Sleptsov, Anand, & 
Vasudeva, 2013). These intermediary firms can reduce information asymmetries in the 
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M&A market, by serving as an important source of specialized information and expertise 
for the acquirers (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994; Servaes & Zenner, 1996).  
However, these intermediary relationships are also rife with agency issues for the 
buyer. For example, the fees collected by investment bankers from their clients are often 
determined as a percentage of final purchase price, thus creating conflicting interests in 
the final price paid (Hitt et al., 2012). In fact, Stouraitis (2003) found that investment 
banks acting as advisors to acquirers negotiate favorable terms when they invest their 
own money in the deal, but lead their clients to overpay when they do not have financial 
incentives. Specifically, he found that the smallest premiums are paid when the bank 
finances the deal and the largest premiums are paid when the bank is paid a fee 
contingent on deal completion with premiums between these two extremes found when 
acquirers do not use advisors.  
Similarly, other common intermediaries, such as venture capitalist firms, often 
have an equity stake in the target firm and thus are aligned with the seller in seeking the 
highest possible premiums. Acquirer interlocks and network ties with professional 
intermediaries often also lead to higher premiums because top executives draw on their 
previous experiences in determining premiums at other companies to evaluate the 
current acquisition. This effect is heightened under conditions of uncertainty such as in 
knowledge intensive industries (Haunschild, 1994). Thus, while it may be in the interest 
of target firms to build interorganizational relationships with third parties in the M&A 
market to leverage the agency issues between the buyer and the intermediary to capture a 
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higher premium, the mechanism suggesting that these relationships influence premiums 
due to their signaling power is suspect.  
Regardless of the type of signals used to convey a target’s quality, Coff (1999) 
suggests three information dilemmas for potential acquirers regarding target firms: (i) 
uncertain quality, (ii) uncertain transferability, and (iii) uncertain synergy potential. 
While the research on signaling target quality has been strong and varied, though subject 
to some criticism due to alternative explanations as explained above, there has been 
limited attention to understanding how targets reduce uncertainties surrounding 
transferability and synergy.  
Ndofor and Levitas (2004) provide an exception, though the context is different 
than acquisition markets. In this study the authors expand on the difficulties of 
knowledge intensive firms signaling knowledge differences to capital and labor markets, 
without enabling competitors to copy or imitate the knowledge. Warner, Fairbank, and 
Steensma (2006) take a different perspective on the same issue of uncertainties by 
suggesting a real options framework for understanding acquisitions of firms with 
intellectual property.  
The limited attention to how targets reduce uncertainties surrounding 
transferability and synergy is especially troubling for the M&A context considering that 
expected synergies, driven by the transferability and rebundling of resources and 
capabilities, serve as a main determinant of the premium paid (Hitt et al., 2012). 
However, this limited work could in part be due to the difficulties in understanding what 
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within a firm can or should be transferred, and how a target can communicate this value 
while protecting its competitive position in its product market.   
In summary, signaling theory provides a mechanism for understanding how firms 
can convey information to a variety of markets or receivers. However, in the case of 
acquisitions, target firms must simultaneously balance the need to convey information 
regarding not only quality, but also transferability and potential synergies that allows 
them to increase premiums while also protecting privileged, internal information from 
competitors. Previous research on signaling theory and M&As has examined a variety of 
signals such as ownership, financing, board prestige, and interorganizational 
relationships that can convey overall quality of the target firm. But, this work has not 
focused on identifying the best signals for conveying information regarding 
transferability and potential synergies while also enabling a target to continue to 
compete advantageously against rivals. Recent work on competitive dynamics, 
specifically the focus on competitive repertoires, may provide a mechanism for firms to 
signal how they are able to transform their resources over time to generate value. Thus, I 
suggest that through the management and realization of competitive repertoires over 
time, targets can convey information about how their resources are best transformed to 
generate value – signaling important information to multiple prospective acquirers about 
how their resources could be transferred or rebundled by buyers for potential synergies.  
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Competitive Action Repertoires 
As originally conceptualized, competitive dynamics focuses on the study of 
interfirm rivalry based on firms’ specific competitive actions and reactions, their strategy 
and organizational context, and their drivers and consequences within the broader field 
of competitive strategy (Chen, 1996; Chen & Miller, 2012). While the original focus was 
on the specific actions exchanged by firms, and the pairwise comparison of rivals, more 
recent work has extended this dyadic view to examine competitive activity at the 
business (Derfus, Maggitti, Grimm, & Smith, 2008; Ferrier et al., 1999) and corporate 
levels (Anand, Mesquita, & Vassolo, 2009; Yu & Cannella, 2007). In this dissertation I 
consider competitive strategy at the corporate level. However, regardless of the level of 
analysis, research in competitive dynamics centers around three broad purposes: (i) 
predicting competitive behavior, (ii) capturing asymmetric competitive relationships 
between firms, and (iii) linking strategy formulation to implementation (Chen & Miller, 
2012).  
With the extension of competitive dynamics research from action/response dyads 
to business and corporate levels of analysis, the focus changed to understanding firms’ 
competitive actions over time, commonly referred to as competitive repertoires (Miller 
& Chen, 1996a; Ferrier et al., 1999). Competitive repertoires commonly consider all 
types of actions taken by a firm in a sequence or time period, including both strategic 
and tactical actions. While not the first to propose the importance of examining 
repertoires, Ferrier (2001) suggests that sequences of competitive actions can be 
interpreted as a process theory of competitive interaction. In other words, competitive 
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repertoires account for “how the sequence of moves in each attack unfolds over time and 
the possibility that an intended sequence of actions might give way to an emergent 
sequence as rivals develop competitive responses” (Ferrer, 2001: 859). This 
conceptualization gives rise to the notion that while repertoires are managed over time, 
they are influenced by rivals’ actions and the environment as it changes. Thus, it is 
important to consider both strategic and tactical competitive actions simultaneously to 
better understand the emergence of a firm’s competitive strategy over a given period. 
Further, by invoking the idea of competitive repertoires as a process theory, the 
“diagnosis of patterns in observable activities, events or behaviors over time…using the 
chronological order of events as data” becomes possible (Van de Ven, 1992: 170). In 
other words, competitive repertoire properties are more than the sum of the parts; they 
are unique gestalt characteristics of the aggregated set of individual actions (Ariely & 
Carmon, 2000; Rindova et al., 2010). In seeking to understand the strategic patterns in 
competitive repertoires, three main gestalt characterizations have become dominant: the 
simplicity or complexity of an action portfolio (Miller & Chen 1996a), the similarity or 
deviance of the competitive actions over time from industry norms (Miller & Chen, 
1994), and the predictability or unpredictability of a sequence of actions across years 
(Ferrier, 2001). Each of these characteristics represent a continuum with many firms 
falling somewhere in between the two extremes.  
Competitive repertoire simplicity, and its inverse complexity, refers to the 
breadth or range of actions taken by a firm over time (Miller & Chen, 1996a). Miller 
(1993: 117) defines simplicity as “an overwhelming preoccupation with a single goal, 
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strategic activity, department, or world view – one that increasingly precludes 
consideration of any others.” As related to competitive actions, a firm’s repertoire that is 
characterized by simplicity focuses on a narrow range of actions. It is important to note, 
however, that a firm engaging in a simple repertoire over time does not have to engage 
in the exact same behaviors all the time; rather, it engages in relatively few types of 
competitive actions at any given point of time (Carnes, Xu, & Sirmon, 2015). In other 
words the difference between a simple or a complex repertoire is not the use of identical 
actions over a firm’s entire history, but rather the range of competitive action types 
during any given time period.  
Repertoire simplicity has been linked to a variety of firm outcomes including 
performance (Ndofor et al., 2011), firm reputation (Basdeo et al, 2006), industry leader 
dethronement (Ferrier et al., 1999), and revenue (Miller & Chen, 1996a). Broadly, these 
works and others suggest that competitive simplicity decreases, while its inverse 
competitive complexity increases, these desired firm outcomes. For example, Ndofor et 
al. (2011) suggested that a complex repertoire may increase firm performance because a 
wide variety of actions may more fully utilize a firm’s entire available resource 
portfolio. Similarly, Miller and Chen (1996a) suggest that the oversimplification of an 
action repertoire may cause a firm to miss important market opportunities and Ferrier et 
al (1999) describe how competitive complexity captures the notion of competitiveness as 
originally described in Austrian economics (e.g. Schumpeter, 1934, 1950; Kirzner, 
1973).   
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The similarity, or inversely the deviance, of a competitive action repertoire 
differs from repertoire simplicity-complexity because this characteristic reflects the 
degree of adherence or departure from industry norms for competitive interaction 
(Ndofor et al., 2011). Specifically, repertoire similarity is represented by a firm that 
closely follows industry recipes (Sirmon & Hitt, 2009) to guide its competitive 
behaviors. Alternatively, competitive deviance arises from a novel mix of competitive 
action types, or from a sequence of actions that are seldom seen in an industry and is 
synonymous with other terms such as repertoire dissimilarity (Ferrier et al., 1999) and 
attack heterogeneity (Ferrier & Lee, 2002).  
Analogous to research on repertoire simplicity/complexity, repertoire similarity 
has been found to be negatively associated with a range of firm outcomes. Overall, 
research has suggested that firms exhibiting repertoire similarity are less able to surprise 
competitors (Chen & MacMillan, 1992), and thus are easier for competitors to anticipate 
and imitate or retaliate against (Chen & Miller, 1994). Specifically, competitive action 
repertoire deviance has been found to increase market share gains by top firms (Caves & 
Ghemawat, 1992). In fact, D’Aveni (1994) suggests that a firm enacting a mix or 
sequence of actions that are different from the industry norms, disrupts competition and 
changes the rules of competition in its favor.  
Defined as “the extent to which a firm’s sequential order of competitive actions 
is dissimilar from one attack period to the next,” competitive action repertoire 
unpredictability is the third common repertoire pattern characteristic (Ferrier, 2001: 
861). While related to repertoire complexity and deviance, unpredictability does not 
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require a broad range of actions, or even actions that are outside industry norms, but 
instead is created when the previously used competitive actions are undertaken in 
structurally dissimilar sequences compared to previous time periods (Rindova et al., 
2010). Unpredictability is a unique characteristic as compared to complexity and 
deviance because it captures the repetitiveness of action over time, instead of the 
differences between types of actions by a firm (complexity), or differences in actions 
between firms within an industry (deviance).  
The benefit of competitive unpredictability has been established as the ability to 
surprise competition (Ferrer, 2001) and aggressively disrupt the status quo of 
competition within an industry (D’Aveni, 1994). Specifically, competitive 
unpredictability has been shown to delay competitive response (Ferrier, 2001) due to the 
inability of firms to link the prior sequence of actions, the current sequence of actions, 
and performance outcomes (D’Aveni, 1994). Further, unpredictability is often associated 
with competitive aggressiveness which has been shown to increase firm performance 
relative to rivals (Ferrier, 2001). 
While competitive repertoire simplicity, similarity, and predictability all have 
been linked to negative performance outcomes in competition in prior research, these 
same characteristics can serve as beneficial signals to identify quality target firms in the 
M&A market. In other words, while engaging in simple, similar, and predictable 
competitive patterns may be detrimental to immediate firm performance, these patterns 
can serve as gestalt signals that reduce information asymmetries for potential acquirers 
and thereby increase acquisition premiums for the target firms. Specifically, due to the 
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high difficulty and cost of engaging in these three competitive gestalts, target firms are 
able to effectively reduce information asymmetries, increase processing fluency, and 
create a separating equilibrium that all combine to increase the target firm’s acquisition 
premiums. Thus, there becomes incentives for high quality target firms to engage in 
simple, similar, and predictable sequences in the form of increased premiums, but 
disincentives for low quality firms to do the same because of a decrease in firm 
performance. 
In the next chapter, I develop the idea of competitive repertoire gestalts as unique 
signals independent from the individual actions comprising a sequence and suggest how 
the presence of such gestalt characteristics can increase acquisition premiums by 
enhancing buyer understanding. Further, I develop the cost and differentiating ability of 
each of the three gestalts properties considered herein (simplicity, similarity, and 
unpredictability) with regards to their ability to serve as effective signals of resource 
transferability and potential synergies, and thus increase acquisition premiums. Lastly, I 
discuss how buyer and environmental characteristics can enhance or mitigate the 
salience of these gestalt signals for the M&A market.  
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CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
Repertoire Properties as Gestalt Signals for Acquisition Premiums 
 Competitive actions are observable, externally directed commitments designed to 
achieve specific marketplace objectives and thus they convey information about a firm’s 
intentions, characteristics, and resources (Basdeo et al., 2006). While a variety of firm 
actions such as internal resource investments (e.g., R&D and marketing investments) or 
governance characteristics (Sanders & Boivie, 2004) can also serve as signals for firms, 
competitive actions are critical signals as they exhibit high visibility and high strength.  
Signal visibility refers to the ability of outsiders and receivers to detect and 
observe the signal (Ramaswami, Dreher, Bretz, & Wiethoff, 2010). Because competitive 
actions are externally directed and occur in the competitive marketplace, both rivals and 
other stakeholders such as potential acquirers are able to clearly observe the action. 
Signal strength, on the other hand, refers to the level of importance, or salience, a signal 
has for a given signaler. This notion is akin to what Connelly et al. (2011: 53) describe 
as signal fit, which is “the extent to which the signal is correlated with unobservable 
quality.” In other words, because competitive actions are externally directed strategic 
activities taken to achieve specific goals, they are both highly observable and are 
difficult to decouple from underlying firm characteristics and resources.  
For example, in 2011 amid declining performance HP introduced the TouchPad 
tablet with much fanfare in an apparent effort to signal innovativeness and growth 
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opportunities. However, after customer backlash due to poor performance, HP cut the 
price three times within one week before abandoning the product a mere seven weeks 
after release. Thus, despite the desire by HP to signal quality to the market, by using a 
competitive action (new product release) without having the underlying capabilities 
resulted in a public relations nightmare. This example demonstrates how a firm may 
wish to undertake a competitive action, such as new product launch, to convey quality to 
the market; however, without the underlying resources and ability to transform such 
resources, a firm does not have the capacity to complete such actions successfully, as 
evidenced by HP’s price cuts and discontinuation of the TouchPad. Further, the 
effectiveness of the action taken by the firm in the marketplace suggests the capability of 
the firm in transforming their resources to generate and capture value in the market. 
Thus, competitive actions are visible and strong signals due to the expense and difficulty 
in decoupling the signal (action) from underlying resources.   
An important disadvantage to consider in studying competitive actions as market 
signals is the notion that individual signals are snapshots in a particular point of time 
(Davila et al., 2003). Competitive actions are only able to convey information to a 
market about the resources and capabilities within a firm at a given point in time, and in 
a given set of market conditions. Because organizations operate in dynamic, and 
sometimes hypercompetitive environments (D’Aveni, 1994), the validity of the 
information provided by a single signal is difficult to ascertain and signaling firms will 
need to continue transmitting signals in order to reduce information asymmetries and 
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maintain differentiation from low quality actors (Janney & Folta, 2003; Park & Mezias, 
2005).  
Shifting focus in competitive dynamics from individual competitive actions to 
competitive repertoires parallels this notion of moving from snapshots to patterns in 
signaling theory. While competitive repertoire characteristics have previously been 
viewed from a process theory perspective in competitive dynamics (e.g., Ferrier, 2001), 
the characteristics of aggregate patterns also can be considered gestalt properties because 
they are distinct from, but comprised of, the sum of the parts. Similarly, from 
psychological research on pattern perception, gestalt properties are considered 
characteristics that “depend on the interrelations among component parts” (Kimchi, 
1992: 35). These properties have also been described as configurational or emergent 
(Rindova et al., 2010).  
Considering the gestalt properties of competitive repertoires as signals, instead of 
examining individual signals over time, offers a variety of benefits. First, the gestalt 
repertoire properties (simplicity, similarity, and predictability) are inherently 
longitudinal. Repertoire characteristics are the patterns and unique properties of multiple 
actions taken over time (Ferrier, 2001); thus, gestalt properties offer more information 
than a single signal transmitted in isolation or with high frequency. Second, gestalt 
characteristics may offer a clearer view of how a firm is able to utilize and transform its 
resource base over time – something that is of primary interest for potential buyers 
desiring to transfer or transform a resource base in order to generate synergies. For 
example, one firm may engage in a new product release or move into a new market in a 
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time period prior to a potential buyer evaluating the firm; but, only examining the 
occurrence, or even number, of these actions does not reveal how a firm is using a 
diverse resource base over time as engaging in a complex or deviant repertoire might 
signal.  
Finally, by examining repertoire characteristics instead of individual actions, the 
signal fit is improved because the cost of decoupling the signal from underlying 
resources or strategic intentions is very high. In the case of a competitive repertoire 
gestalt characteristic serving as a signal, it would likely be prohibitively expensive for an 
organization to mismatch its internal resource transformations with competitive actions, 
especially in the long run. In other words, by examining the gestalt characteristics of 
action sequences, potential buyers are able to accurately filter out irrelevant actions 
(noise) and ploys by firms yielding a stronger and truer signal.  
An interesting example of the power of patterns is seen in the Good Judgment 
Project (www.goodjudgementproject.com) which is a partnership between three 
psychologists and the U.S. intelligence community that uses ordinary citizens to predict 
major events such as terrorist attacks. Specifically, the CIA has found that 
crowdsourcing information from a few thousand civilians, with no special (top secret) 
knowledge, yields more accurate results than sourcing information from a few experts 
with special, top secret information. The conclusion to this counter-intuitive finding is 
that the increased number of information sources naturally filters out irrelevant 
information and biases to center around a fairly accurate mean (Spiegel, 2014). Thus, 
similar to how large numbers of predictions can center around an accurate result, gestalt 
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properties of competitive actions serve as a viable indicator of the types of resource 
transformation actions routinely used by firms in order to generate and capture value 
over time.  
While the above arguments suggest that competitive repertoire gestalt properties 
are strong signals, in the context of an acquisition market, the salience of these signals 
depends on their ability to reduce information asymmetries. Research in sensemaking 
theory and work on gestalt properties in psychology suggest that holistic or global 
patterns and properties are naturally perceived and interpreted (Weick, 1995; Whitson & 
Galinsky, 2008) and are not present in the component parts of the stimulus (Rindova et 
al., 2010). Specifically, research on gestalt properties and pattern perception suggest that 
individuals can integrate information in unfolding sequences of events by attending to 
salient gestalt properties instead of focusing on recent individual events or signals in 
isolation (Ariely & Carmon, 2000; Ariely & Zauberman 2000; Einhorn & Hogarth 
1986). In fact, research finds that high ambiguity or a lack of control results in seeing 
and seeking patterns (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). Because acquisitions are often 
characterized by high ambiguity (Schijven & Hitt, 2012), the perception and use of 
gestalt properties becomes particularly important as a mechanism for understanding how 
information is received and processed by potential acquirers.  
Beyond recognizing the efficacy of the signal, gestalt properties influence 
evaluations because they integrate the disparate parts of a sequence into a perceived 
whole and thus increase the processing fluency and ease of interpretation (Mishra et al., 
2006). Thus, in order to process and understand large amounts of information, receivers 
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naturally process information in chunks or groups in order to ease their understanding 
and interpretation of the information. This work in psychology is supported by recent 
advancements in neuroscience that suggest that humans form perceptions based on 
complex interactions of identified components (Pelli & Tillman, 2008). For example, 
while many songs may begin with similar musical notes, it is the combination of these 
notes, the instruments used, and the melody that enable people to easily recognize and 
differentiate among the thousands of songs previously heard. Thus, while a person may 
not remember the first notes of a song, nor even the lyrics, s/he can understand, interpret 
and reference the song as a whole. Building from this logic, in an acquisitions market 
buyers searching for a target firm are likely to process the large sets of information, such 
as various competitive actions, holistically as patterns, regardless of the signalers’ 
intentions, in order to better understand the identity of a firm and how it might integrate 
with the buyer.  
Through increasing processing fluency and a receiver’s ease of understanding, 
gestalt properties have been found to consistently increase positive evaluations (Lee & 
Labroo, 2004; Reber, Winkeilman, & Schwarz, 1998). In other words, receivers naturally 
evaluate information that has clear patterns more favorably. While developed in 
psychology research, the gestalt properties to positive evaluation relationship has been 
supported in management research in a range of contexts including investors in nascent 
markets (Rindova et al., 2010) and investor judgments of entrepreneurial identity and 
new venture plausibility (Navis & Glynn, 2011). Thus, gestalt competitive repertoire 
characteristics such as simplicity, similarity, and predictability may not only signal 
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information about the value of resources and help potential buyers understand the 
possible synergies, but they also form patterns that increase processing fluency and, in 
turn, increase positive evaluations.  
It is important to note here however, that while gestalt properties of competitive 
action sequences increase the ease of buyer understanding, this information is not 
targeted to any single potential buyer. Specifically, by reducing information asymmetries 
and easing interpretation through holistic processing in buyers, targets can engender 
positive evaluations from a broad audience. For example, Rindova et al. (2010) found 
that observable competitive patterns increased positive evaluations of firms across many 
different investors as captured by stock price increases. In an acquisitions market, by 
creating a broad, positive evaluation it might be possible for target firms to attract 
multiple bidders, or at least the threat of multiple bidders. In a situation where a potential 
buyer feels pressure from rivals, premiums are likely to increase (Varaiya, 1987). In fact, 
the potential for competitive bidding can sometimes inflate the premium beyond the 
point of reasonable value for the buyer (e.g., winner’s curse, Sinower, 1997). While this 
is not in the best interest of a potential acquirer, from a target firm’s perspective enticing 
multiple bidders can serve the purpose of obtaining the highest possible acquisition 
premium offer.  
Thus, in the M&A market increased positive evaluations can lead to a greater 
number of interested potential acquirers which in turn may engender higher premiums. 
Based on this logic, I offer the following proposition: 
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Proposition 1: Competitive action gestalt characteristics positively influence 
acquisition premiums. 
The above arguments and proposition suggest that the presence of gestalt 
properties increases processing fluency and thus may increase a target firm’s acquisition 
premium. These arguments serve as a foundation for the hypotheses presented in the 
next sections, as the benefits of engaging in simple, similar and predictable competitive 
repertoires is due to the ease of potential acquirers to recognize and understand these 
patterns. However, the specific salience of these properties as signals depends on their 
ability to reduce information asymmetries surrounding target quality, transferability, and 
synergy for a broad audience. Because much prior research has examined ways to help 
reduce information asymmetries regarding underlying target firm quality (e.g., Reuer et 
al., 2012), in the next sections, I focus on developing the salience of each of these three 
gestalt characteristics in turn as signals for transferability and potential synergy in a 
M&A market. Specifically, I argue that engaging in simple, similar, and predictable 
competitive action repertoires convey unique information regarding the transferability 
and potential synergies of a target firm and creates a separating equilibrium where firms 
without the underlying characteristics are not able to mimic such behaviors. Thus, by 
engaging in these gestalt characteristics of their competitive action repertoires, target 
firms are able to reduce information asymmetries for multiple potential buyers and 
increase their acquisition premiums.  
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Competitive Simplicity. Engaging in a simple competitive repertoire, where a firm uses a 
relatively narrow range of actions, may be a signal of having strong internal resources, 
capabilities, and core competencies. If a firm owns or controls rare and valuable 
resources, it can focus on a single goal or transformation of these resources in order to 
generate and capture value (Barney, 1986). In fact, the sustainability of a firm’s 
competitive advantage is a function of the ease with which assets can be substituted or 
imitated (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). The more difficult it is for rivals to duplicate strategic 
resources controlled by a firm, the longer a firm is able to leverage its advantage. 
Because competitive simplicity involves leveraging the same types of actions in a 
market repeatedly, rivals may be able to identify what the underlying causes are of the 
focal firm’s competitive advantage. However, if the resources and capabilities 
themselves are difficult to imitate or substitute, a firm does not need to rely on secrecy to 
sustain its competitive advantage. The firm’s competitive advantage is sustained simply 
by the valuable, rare, inimitable, and nonsubstitutable nature of the controlled resources 
(Barney, 1991). Thus, competitive simplicity may be a signal of the underlying strength 
of a resource portfolio.  
Further, a simple competitive repertoire may also allow a firm to concentrate on 
developing and maintaining a few core competencies allowing the firm to obtain the 
advantages of focus (Rogers, 1992; Treacy & Wiersema, 1995). Such core competencies 
attract customers and are able to be defended from imitation by rivals (Lenoard-Barton, 
1992; Lippman & Rumelt, 1982; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). Efficiency and effectiveness 
reduce the costs associated with competition and may allow for a firm to realize superior 
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gains. In fact, more recent work on the resource-based theory suggests that the 
synchronization of activities across a firm can provide value above and beyond resources 
and individual managerial actions (Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007; Sirmon, Hitt, Ireland, 
& Gilbert, 2011). While empirical work on synchronization is limited, current work 
suggests that firms vary significantly in their ability to integrate actions and that such 
behaviors are fairly limited (Sirmon & Hitt, 2009). Thus, the ability to integrate actions 
and resources within a firm and concentrate on developing, maintaining, and leveraging 
a few core competences in the market may be related to competitive simplicity.  
While simple competitive repertoires may often be a function of current or past 
success, paradoxically, they often can lead to future failure (Miller, 1993; Miller & 
Chen, 1996a). As described previously, competitive simplicity has been linked to 
reductions in future performance (Miller & Chen, 1996a). Specifically, the inverse of 
simplicity has been shown to be related to higher performance (Ndofor et al., 2011), 
market share gain (Ferrier et al., 1999), better reputation (Basdeo et al 2006), and sales 
growth and profitability (Ferrier & Lyon, 2004). Further, Miller (1993) argues that a 
common cause of organizational decline is actually firm simplicity or an overwhelming 
focus on a single goal or strategic activity. The context for these findings have also been 
varied, ranging from Fortune 500 firms (Ferrier & Lyon, 2004), to the Most Admired 
Companies list (Basdeo et al., 2006), to the airline industry (Miller & Chen, 1996a), and 
to the in vitro medical diagnostic substance manufacturing industry (Ndofor et al., 2011). 
Overall, these findings across a variety of contexts and outcomes suggest that the costs 
and risks of engaging in a simple competitive repertoire are high.  
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Because of the difficulty in engaging in a simple competitive repertoire, as a 
signal, this gestalt competitive characteristic creates a separating equilibrium. In other 
words, for firms with strong resources and capabilities, the benefits of engaging in 
competitive repertoire simplicity are high and the risks are relatively low because these 
firms are able to sustain their source of competitive advantage despite multiple rivals and 
potential buyers being able to understand the underlying cause of their advantage. 
However, for firms without strategic underlying resources and capabilities that rely on 
out-maneuvering rivals in the market, competitive simplicity is difficult to sustain 
because it allows rivals to imitate a firm’s core competencies more easily. Thus, while it 
is difficult for a firm to compete using competitive repertoire simplicity, if a firm is able 
to do so because of its underlying resources and capabilities, it is able to convey 
information about their core competencies to the market more clearly. This information 
can be used by multiple potential acquirers to better understand how such resources and 
capabilities could be integrated with their own to produce potential synergies. Further, 
simple patterns of stimuli contain readily identifiable core patterns and thus enable 
outsiders to “grasp a pattern without having to understand all relationships among 
constituent elements” (Rindova et al., 2010: 1478). Thus, the difficulty of engaging in 
competitive repertoire simplicity as a signal, coupled with the benefit of simplicity as a 
gestalt property for enhancing holistic processing and associated positive buyer 
interpretations, causes for competitive simplicity to reduce information asymmetries and 
engender positive evaluations from multiple potential acquirers thus creating pressure 
for higher offered premiums. Therefore, I suggest:  
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Hypothesis 1: Target firm competitive action sequences exhibiting high simplicity 
will be positively associated with acquisition premiums. 
 
Competitive Similarity. A firm engaging in competitive similarity is conforming to the 
competitive norms within an industry. The benefits of competitive similarity for target 
firms engendering higher acquisition premiums are largely twofold. First, if a firm is 
able to effectively compete within the expectations of an industry, it is likely that they 
have an advantageous market position, either in product markets, or strategic factor 
markets, or possibly both (Barney, 1986). Such a position in a strategic factor market 
suggests that a firm has some underlying capabilities in accurately understanding and 
predicting the value of inputs such that they can obtain the inputs from the market for 
less than the value to the firm. Similarly, an advantageous position in the product market 
might suggest that a firm has benefits of a strong distribution network, or a high 
reputation in consumers’ minds – both valuable intangible assets that can be difficult to 
imitate or substitute (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). Further, there is a strong stream of 
research in operations management that suggests the capability of a firm to manage its 
supply network is valuable, rare, inimitable, and nonsubstiutable, yielding an 
advantageous market position and competitive advantage (e.g., Dyer & Nobeoka, 2006; 
Lavie, 2006). Thus, a firm exhibiting competitive similarity may not have a need to 
engage in deviant actions to generate and capture value because the firm occupies a 
superior position within current markets.   
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Second, some research suggests that employing strategic consistency in 
competitive actions over time is linked to long-term organizational survival (Lamberg, 
Tikkanen, Nokelainen, & Suur-Inkeroinen, 2009). Specifically, Lamberg and colleagues 
(2009) suggest that competitive actions enhance firm survival when they are consistent 
both with a firm’s own history and with the environment. Thus, strategic consistency 
suggests both an effective competitive strategy (Porter, 1980) and an ability to adapt to 
external changes at a rate which is concurrent to the business context (Eisenhardt & 
Brown, 1998). Further, the benefits of conforming to competitive norms may be 
dependent on a firm’s context. Specifically, for smaller companies within well-defined 
markets, nonconformity was found to be associated with decreased financial 
performance (Miller & Chen, 1996b). Other recent work has suggested that firms with 
strong positions take conservative or expected actions in established markets in order to 
preserve the status quo (Chen, Katila, McDonald, & Eisenhardt, 2010) 
Despite the benefits for increasing acquisition premiums, engaging in 
competitive similarity has costs associated with the difficulty in building and 
maintaining a competitive advantage. Indeed, a central tenet in much strategy literature 
is that there is value in strategic differentiation (Porter, 1980). Specifically, Penrose 
(1959) suggested that it is in the heterogeneity of actions that gives each firm a unique 
character and allows it to provide different kinds of services. These ideas have been 
substantiated in competitive dynamics empirical research with findings suggesting 
benefits of engaging in deviant actions. Specifically, deviance has been found to be 
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associated with higher performance (Ndofor et al., 2011), higher market returns (Ferrier 
& Lee, 2002), and slower response times from rivals (Chen & Miller, 1994).  
Similar to previous arguments, the difficulty for a firm to compete and maintain a 
competitive advantage using a competitive repertoire characterized by similarity creates 
a high cost for firms that do not have the advantages of underlying resources and 
capabilities sustaining a superior market position. Thus, as a signal, the gestalt property 
of similarity in a competitive repertoire creates a separating equilibrium such that there 
are benefits for high quality firms to engage in such behaviors, but the costs are such that 
low quality firms are unable to do the same. In other words, if a firm competes using 
competitive repertoire similarity, it is able to send a signal to multiple potential buyers 
about the underlying sources of its advantages (such as supplier or distribution networks) 
and its ability to protect this advantage despite outsiders’ ability to identify the source of 
the advantage. This information could be used by multiple potential acquirers to better 
understand how these sources of advantage might be transferred to their firm and be 
integrated to generate synergies.  
Following previous logic, competitive repertoire similarity aids in outsiders 
interpreting a firm’s underlying resources and capabilities and thus may make it an 
attractive target to multiple buyers. By engaging in expected types of competitive 
actions, firms with competitive similarity are easily compared to rivals within an 
industry aiding in outsiders’ understanding and thus potentially engendering positive 
evaluations by multiple potential acquirers. Due to competitive bidding pressure felt by 
buyers because of a target’s potential broad appeal, premiums are likely to increase. 
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Thus, competitive simplicity reduces information asymmetry in the market and can lead 
to positive evaluations from multiple potential acquirers and increase premiums offered. 
Stated formally:  
Hypothesis 2: Target firm competitive action sequences exhibiting high similarity 
will be positively associated with acquisition premiums. 
 
Competitive Predictability. The predictability of a competitive repertoire captures the 
timing or rhythm of competition across time periods. It is associated with the ability of 
rival firms to anticipate the types of actions taken within a sequence (Rindova et al., 
2010). Similar to similarity and simplicity, much prior research in management has 
found several disadvantages for engaging in predictable competitive behavior. 
Specifically, prior work has suggested the value of inter-temporal heterogeneity of 
strategy (Gimeno & Woo, 1996; Jacobson, 1992). Further, in competitive dynamics 
research, unpredictable competitive sequences have been found to lead to higher firm 
performance (Ferrier, 2001) and are associated with abnormal stock market returns 
(Ferrier & Lee, 2002).  
 These disadvantages create a high cost for competing with a predictable strategy. 
However, there are also benefits to engaging in rhythmic strategic competitive decisions, 
such as entering or exiting markets, building capacity, or forming strategic partnerships, 
though previous research has often explored these benefits internally in a firm. Some 
work suggests that rhythm helps managers plan their progress in strategic decision 
making, such as with competitive moves, and enables them to stay proactive instead of 
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reactive (Eisenhardt, 1999). Further, the familiarity of competitive sequences may 
reduce the time necessary for top executives to decide to engage in competitive activity. 
Specifically, executives may be able to “quickly conceive of, decide on, and implement 
attacks … that are carried out in a predictable manner” (Ferrier, 2001: 872). Therefore, 
engaging in predictable competitive sequences may enable a firm to more effectively 
utilize managerial time.  
Second, predictability, or cross-time similarity, allows for multiple outside 
observers to extend and extrapolate particular sequences as the observed order of the 
components is expected to continue in subsequent periods (Ariely & Carmon, 2000; 
Rindova et al., 2010). In other words, a predictable competitive sequence enables many 
different outsiders to anticipate what competitive moves may be forthcoming by 
extrapolating from previous sequences. This could enable prospective acquirers to 
anticipate how a target firm is planning to transform and leverage its resources in the 
market. By anticipating how a target will generate and capture value from its underlying 
resources and capabilities, buyers could use this information to understand how such 
activities could be recombined within their own firms to generate synergies. Thus, by 
facilitating pattern perception and sensemaking, predictable competitive sequences may 
lead to higher evaluations and increased interest by multiple potential buyers. This in 
turn creates a perceived competitive pressure amongst buyers for the target firm that may 
lead to higher acquisition premium offers. Stated formally, I suggest:  
Hypothesis 3: Target firm competitive action sequences exhibiting high 
predictability will be positively associated with acquisition premiums. 
 42 
 
 
Moderating effects of Firm Relatedness and Environmental Dynamism 
The previous hypotheses share a foundation that suggests that competitive 
repertoire gestalt properties can be strong signals that may ease the interpretation and 
understanding of target firm resources and capabilities by multiple acquirers and thus 
enhance premiums due to perceived competitive pressures by buyers. However, the 
salience of gestalt properties is largely dependent on outsiders’ ability to correctly and 
easily interpret all of the available information about a target’s quality, transferability, 
and synergy. This section explores how the efficacy of these competitive repertoire 
gestalt properties varies based on acquirer and environmental characteristics.  
 
Target and Acquiring Firm Relatedness. The relatedness of target and acquiring firms 
is one of the most studied predictor variables in M&A research (Hitt et al., 2012). 
Despite the high prevalence of this topic, empirical results remain mixed. Some findings 
have suggested that greater relatedness leads to greater M&A performance (Finkelstein 
& Haleblian, 2002) and unrelatedness leads to lower performance (Hoskisson, Hitt, 
Johnson, & Moesel, 1993). Other work has suggested that both related and unrelated 
targets and buyers can lead to higher performance (Seth, 1990). Finally, some studies 
suggest no relationship exists (Singh & Montgomery, 1987) or that the nature of the 
relationship is curvilinear instead of liner (Palich, Cardinal, & Miller, 2000). Finally, a 
more recent argument proposes that this relationship may be tenuous because a buyer 
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may be choosing to engage in more unrelated acquisitions due to core industry decline, 
confounding performance effects (Park, 2003).     
In attempts to better understand such mixed findings, more recent research has 
begun to explore the relationship between acquiring and target firm relatedness and 
innovation outcomes in M&As. Specifically, the relatedness of a buyer and a target’s 
technological knowledge predicts M&A innovation performance (Cloodt, Hagedoorn, & 
Van Kranenburg, 2006; Cassiman, Colombo, Garrone, & Veugelers, 2005; Hagedoorn & 
Duysters, 2002). This is suggested to occur because too much similarity may reduce the 
acquirer’s opportunities for learning (Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1996). 
However, if the knowledge is too dissimilar, then buyers are unable to assimilate and 
integrate target firm knowledge decreasing performance (Cloodt et al., 2006). Thus, 
complementarities are found to be better than similarities in firm relatedness for 
innovation performance after M&As (Makri, Hitt, & Lane, 2010). Overall, while this 
stream of research is focused on innovation outcomes instead of premiums, it provides 
strong insights regarding how acquiring firms can evaluate a target’s intangible 
resources and capabilities for potential synergies.  
This work on acquirer and target firm relatedness in M&As extends to 
acquisition premiums because the more unrelated the corporations are to each other, the 
more difficulty acquirers may have in evaluating a target firm. Because of the 
differences between acquirers and targets in unrelated acquisitions, buyers may not be 
able to apply its industry-specific knowledge (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). 
Specifically, Haspeslagh and Jamison (1991: 54) suggest that “the farther a potential 
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acquisition candidate is form [an acquiring] manager’s experience base, the less capable 
he or she will be of asking the right questions or searching for the right information.” 
Thus, in more unrelated acquisitions, buyers may be less able to understand a target’s 
underlying resources and capabilities. This uncertainty on the part of the buyer may 
increase its search for patterns and holistic properties in order to increase its 
understanding of complex and unfamiliar markets (Witson & Galinsky, 2008). 
Further, separate from being unable to apply current industry-specific knowledge 
to evaluate an unrelated target, such targets may even represent unfamiliar methods of 
value creation (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1994; Singh & Montgomery, 1987). The 
transformation of resources and capabilities to generate and capture value by the target 
may be entirely different than the processes used within buying firms. While this creates 
an opportunity for novel recombinations of such resources and capabilities generating 
new value (Barney, 1986; Dierickx & Cool, 1989) the ability to do so effectively 
remains exceedingly difficult as evidenced by the relatively weak performance of M&As 
over time (King et al., 2004). Together, this suggests that when a target and potential 
acquirers are unrelated, the potential for creating synergies is even more tenuous (Anand 
& Singh, 1997; Balakrishnan, 1988; Singh & Montgomery, 1987). Thus, the greater the 
unrelatedness between buyers and a target, the more difficulty buyers will have in 
understanding a target’s underlying resources and capabilities and in evaluating how 
such resources may be transferred and used to generate synergies. Therefore, the value 
for patterns and holistic processing that can reduce information asymmetries and such 
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uncertainties on the part of unrelated buyers is even greater for an unrelated buyer and 
target.  
In summary, the greater the unrelatedness of a target and potential acquiring 
firms, the more difficult it is for buyers to evaluate the quality, transferability, and, 
perhaps most importantly, the potential synergies of a target’s underlying resources and 
capabilities. Further, because of the high uncertainties in unrelated acquisitions, buyers 
may be more likely to seek and see patterns in signals such as competitive actions 
because it is a compensatory mechanism that can restore feelings of control (Witson & 
Galinsky, 2008). This seeing and seeking of patterns coupled with the tendency to 
summarize and evaluate extended experiences (such as the due diligence process in 
M&As) (Ariely & Carmon, 2000) may increase the importance of gestalt properties for 
increasing processing fluency and thus positive evaluations of the target among multiple 
buyers. The broad desirability of such a target among multiple buyers, whether they are 
related or unrelated, may in turn increase the competitive pressure felt by potential 
buyers which can positively influence premiums offered. Thus, the relatedness of target 
and acquiring firms in a transaction is expected to influence the salience of gestalt 
competitive properties and thus the general desirability of a target and resulting 
acquisition premiums such that the more unrelated the acquisition, the greater the 
positive influence of competitive gestalt properties on acquisition premiums.  
Hypothesis 4: The relatedness of the buyer and target firms negatively moderates 
the positive relationship between target firm competitive action sequences 
exhibiting high (a) simplicity, (b) similarity, or (c) predictability and acquisition 
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premiums such that the relationship between sequence (a) simplicity, (b) 
similarity, or (c) predictability and premium becomes less positive where the 
buyer and target are more related. 
 
Environmental Dynamism. Environmental dynamism represents change in an 
environment that is hard to predict and that heightens uncertainty for key organizational 
members (Dess & Beard, 1984). In later work dynamism is seen to primarily reflect 
volatility and instability (Keats & Hitt, 1988), though other dimensions include velocity, 
complexity, ambiguity, and unpredictability (Davis, Eisenhardt & Bingham, 2009). A 
key element in dynamism is not simply the presence of change in an environment, but 
the lack of a discernable pattern in the change (Mintzberg, 1979).  
 Uncertainty in an environment may influence acquisitions in a variety of ways. 
Overall acquisition activity may be reduced because the value of new resource 
combinations may be in doubt for buyers (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990). However, other 
research has suggested that uncertainty may increase the likelihood of acquisitions over 
other forms of collaboration such as licensing agreements (Schilling & Steensma, 2002). 
Further, acquiring firm characteristics may differentiate the impact of environmental 
characteristics. Specifically, Bergh and Lawless (1998) found that highly diversified 
firms were more likely to pursue acquisitions in increasing environmental uncertainty. In 
fact, target firms have been found to have greater acquisition likelihood in dynamic 
environments (Heeley, King, & Covin, 2006).  
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 In research specifically focused on knowledge based resources and research and 
development (R&D), such intangible resources and capabilities have been shown to have 
greater value in dynamic versus stable environments (Miller & Shamsie, 1996). 
Specifically, the use of such resources and capabilities for innovation may be 
strategically necessary for firms facing dynamic environments (D’Aveni, 1994) because 
such investments can enable firms to cope with the rapid and unpredictable pace of 
change in dynamic environments (King, Covin, & Hegarty, 2003). In fact, dynamic 
environments have been suggested to require firms to sporadically or continuously 
change their resource and capability profiles in order to compete (Rindova & Kotha, 
2001).  
 Further, dynamic environments increase the difficulty for a firm to understand 
the cause-effect relationships between internal resource activities and value creation 
(Reed & DeFillippi, 1990). Specifically, dynamism causes managers to continuously 
redesign capabilities across the firm because of changes in the market and in customer 
needs (Sirmon et al., 2007). In fact, firms need to create a stream of competitive 
advantages because the value of current advantages erodes quickly and is rarely 
sustainable in dynamic environments (D’Aveni, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1999). Thus, because 
of the changes occurring within a firm in a dynamic environment, potential acquirers 
may face greater uncertainty in evaluating potential synergies from new resource 
combinations (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990). 
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 The increased uncertainty associated with dynamic environments may increase 
the salience of gestalt properties for multiple potential acquirers and thus may influence 
acquisition premiums. Previous work on pattern perception and holistic properties in 
psychology suggest that the salience of gestalts increases in highly uncertain 
environments (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). Further, work in management on 
sensemaking theory suggests that uncertain environments can trigger sensemaking 
behavior (Weber & Glynn, 2006; Navis & Glynn, 2011). Specifically, Rindova and 
colleagues (2010) found that in markets characterized by high ambiguity and 
uncertainty, gestalt properties of competitive sequences increased the positive 
evaluations of investors. Thus, I suggest that gestalt properties may engender more 
positive evaluations from multiple outsiders, especially in highly uncertain or ambiguous 
environments by increasing processing fluency and reducing information asymmetries 
for many potential acquirers.  
  While the increasing importance of gestalt properties for multiple potential 
buyers in dynamic environments may increase premiums, the difficulty in maintaining 
such competitive repertoire characteristics may also increase in dynamic environments. 
In other words, the costs of engaging in simple, similar, and predictable competitive 
behaviors may be increased in dynamic environments. However, because of the 
increased costs of such competitive behaviors, it makes it even more difficult to 
decouple the gestalt characteristics from underlying resources and capabilities. This in 
turn may increase the strength of such gestalt signals for multiple potential buyers. Thus, 
stated formally, 
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Hypothesis 5: Environmental dynamism positively moderates the positive 
relationship between target firm competitive action sequences exhibiting high (a) 
simplicity, (b) similarity, or (c) predictability and acquisition premiums such that 
the relationship between sequence (a) simplicity, (b) similarity, or (c) 
predictability and premium becomes more positive in more dynamic 
environments.  
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Sample 
The sample for this study is comprised of acquisitions of public firms that 
recently underwent an initial public offering (IPO). By focusing on public targets I am 
able to collect consistent accounting and financial information for each firm, thus 
allowing the development of a reliable measure of premium. Further, by focusing on 
firms that have recently undergone an IPO, I am able to focus on target firms that are 
generally considered to be entrepreneurial, high-growth firms within their industries and 
are likely to be considered as targets by multiple potential acquirers due to their high 
future growth opportunities and low, if any, takeover defenses (Field & Karpoff, 2002).  
For the first step in my research design I constructed a base sample of newly 
public firms that were acquired by compiling all completed acquisitions with 
announcements occurring between 2001 and 2011 using the Thomson One database, 
which provides detailed information on firms’ IPO and acquisition activities. Following 
precedent in acquisitions research, the sample is restricted to acquisitions that are 
completed with 100 percent ownership of the acquired target, and were undertaken by 
North American acquirers representing all major industry sectors (Schijven & Hitt, 
2012). Next, I merged these data with Thomson One’s IPO data to identify all acquired 
firms that went public within five years prior to the acquisition announcement (e.g., 
Field & Karpoff, 2002; Reuer et al., 2012). Following previous research using IPO firm 
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samples, I excluded transactions associated with real estate investment trusts (REITs), 
closed-end mutual funds, unit offerings, spin-offs, leveraged buyouts (LBOs), and 
offerings by firms in the financial services sector in order to focus the sample on firms 
going public for the first time, instead of various equity offerings (Reuer et al., 2012).    
In order to accurately test my hypotheses, it is necessary to use a time frame in 
which targets’ action sequences are unrelated to an IPO but may be influencing potential 
acquirers. Thus, to reduce any potential confounding actions taken by the firm as part of 
its IPO, all acquisition announcements must occur at least one year after the IPO to be 
included in my sample. This restriction allows me to capture action sequences for a full 
year, a standard time frame for competitive repertoires (e.g., Miller & Chen, 1996; 
Ndofor et al., 2011), prior to an acquisition announcement. As such, my final sample 
consists of target firms that were acquired between 2001 and 2011 and underwent IPO 
within the previous five years from the acquisition announcement.   
Second, I used the RavenPack News Analytics database to collect firm-level 
action data from 2000 to 2010, which corresponds to a year preceding the acquisition 
announcement. This database uses proprietary algorithms to quantify news articles and 
press releases from the Dow Jones Newswire, Wall Street Journal, and Barron’s. The 
RavenPack database creates a time-stamped firm-level entry any time a company is 
mentioned in one of these news outlets. While relatively new in its use in management 
research, RavenPack has been found to produce similar descriptive statistics of strategic 
and tactical actions as previous competitive dynamics research utilizing content analysis 
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of releases gathered from the Lexis-Nexus database (Withers, Sirmon, Tuggle, & Carnes, 
2015).  
Finally, I supplemented these acquisition and action data with firm- and industry-
level financial information from the CRSP and Compustat Fundamental Annual 
databases. In summary, my final sample includes target firms of completed North 
American acquisitions that were announced between 2001 and 2011 and have undergone 
IPO within the previous five years of the announcement. These criteria allow me to 
capture annual action repertoires of target firms after IPO and for at least one year prior 
to the announcement. After accounting for missing data, my final sample size consists of 
129 unique acquired target firms.  
 
Measures 
Dependent Variable. Acquisition premium is calculated as the percentage difference 
between the purchase price paid per share by the acquirer and the target’s share price one 
week prior to the acquisition announcement. Previous research has examined premiums 
based on a range of time frames prior to announcement, from four weeks prior (Reuer et 
al., 2012) to the day of announcement (Laamanen, 2007). Because the goal is to 
minimize possible other influences on stock price while also capturing any increases due 
to announcement anticipation by investors, I chose the one week time frame (Schijven & 
Hitt, 2012). Robustness checks against 1 day and 4 week timelines were also done and 
are discussed in the results section.  
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Independent Variables. Competitive actions are externally-directed, specific, and 
observable moves initiated by the focal firm in order to enhance its competitive position 
(Ferrier et al., 1999; Smith et al., 1991). Most commonly these actions are categorized 
by researchers for use in developing repertoire characteristics. I followed a classification 
system using the RavenPack categories that is most similar to action categories used in 
previous research resulting in eight action categories: acquisitions, new product actions, 
capacity related actions, legal actions, marketing actions, market expansion actions, 
pricing actions, and strategic alliances (Connelly, Tihanyi, Carnes, & Ferrier, 2015; 
Ferrier et al., 2001; Smith et al., 1991; Rindova et al., 2010). For example, if the focal 
firm engages in a lawsuit as a plaintiff, that action would be characterized as a legal 
action. Similarly, if a firm opens, closes, or sells a facility, the action would be 
categorized as a capacity-related action. 
The primary predictor variables in this study are gestalt characteristics of 
competitive repertoires: simplicity, similarity, and predictability. Following previous 
research on competitive repertoires, these characteristics were computed for a time 
frame of one year (e.g., Ferrier, 2001; Ndofor et al., 2011). Competitive simplicity 
measures the heterogeneity of actions in a firm’s portfolio in a given year. Following 
Ferrier (2001), Ndofor et al. (2011), and Ndofor, Sirmon, and He (2014), I calculate 
simplicity using a Herfindahl-type index as represented below: 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 = ∑ 𝑃𝑖
2
𝑖
 
where Pi is the proportion of the i
th-category of competitive actions. Higher values 
represent firms that utilize a narrower range of actions and thus a simpler competitive 
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repertoire; lower values represent firms with a broader range of actions and thus a more 
complex repertoire.  
 Competitive similarity represents the extent to which a firm’s portfolio of actions 
for a given year was similar to those of its competitors. Calculated as the inverse of 
Ndofor et al.’s (2011) competitive deviance (i.e. dissimilarity), competitive similarity is 
the sum of squared difference in proportions of categories of competitive actions 
between the focal firm and the industry mean: 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 1 −  ∑(𝑃𝑖 − 𝑃𝑖)
2
𝑖
 
where Pi is the proportion of the i
th-category of competitive action for the focal firm and 
𝑃𝑖 is the industry mean proportion of the i
th-category of competitive action. Higher 
values represent repertoires that are more similar to the industry norms whereas lower 
values represent repertoires that are more dissimilar, or deviant, from industry norms.  
 Competitive predictability represents the degree of uncertainty in anticipating a 
future event. It is commonly operationalized by using optimal matching analysis to 
calculate Levenshtein distance scores (Ferrier, 2001; Rindova et al., 2010). This analysis 
calculates the need, or cost, of insertions, deletions, or substitutions in order to make one 
sequence identical to another. These value of these changes to make one sequence 
identical to another are referred to as INDEL costs. The most common and objective 
assignment of INDEL costs is 1 for an insertion or deletion, and 2 for a substitution. 
Because these distance scores are subject to differences in the length of competitive 
action sequences, I use a log transformation to normalize the variable for analysis. I also 
 55 
 
explore the robustness of my models by using the standardized distance scores and an 
alternative measure for unpredictability, the Shannon entropy index, in the 
supplementary analyses section.    
  
 Moderator Variables. Firm relatedness captures the industry similarity between the 
target firm and the acquiring firm. I calculated firm relatedness following the traditional 
SIC code-based measure of relatedness. While this measure is admittedly coarse grained, 
it is the most commonly used operationalization of target and acquirer firm relatedness 
in the acquisition literature in the most recent ten to fifteen years (e.g., Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1999; Laamanen & Keil, 2008). Thus, following previous work, firm 
relatedness will be measured using a the three-point ordinal scale, with a value of 2 
assigned if the target and acquirer share the same three-digit SIC code, 1 if the firms 
share the same two-digit but not the same three-digit code, and 0 if the target and the 
acquirer do not share a two-digit SIC code (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Finkelstein & 
Haleblian, 2002; Laamanen & Keil, 2008; Schijven & Hitt, 2012). Environmental 
dynamism captures the level of change or turbulence in an environment. It is calculated 
as the standard error of the regression of sales over time divided by mean industry sales 
(Boyd, 1995; Keats & Hitt, 1988).  
 
Control Variables. I include a number of control variables that may potentially influence 
acquisition premiums and bias my results. These controls also serve to guard against 
potential issues of endogeneity (Studenmund, 2010) and specifically may help avoid 
 56 
 
spurious findings (Schijven & Hitt, 2012). To do so, these controls were selected such 
that, based on previous work, they may be expected to influence competitive activity and 
premiums.  
First, I control for a variety of firm-level variables. Previous work has found that 
prior performance of the target and of the acquirer may influence the premium (Barkema 
& Schijven, 2008). Also, a target’s prior performance may influence its competitive 
repertoires by either enabling or restricting the ability to engage in various actions 
(Ferrier, 2001; Ndofor et al., 2011). Thus, I control for both Target Performance and 
Acquirer Performance by measuring the firms’ profitability in terms of return on assets 
(ROA) for the twelve months prior to the acquisition announcement. Target Firm Size 
may influence acquisition premiums negatively due to decreasing gains in productivity 
of the target’s assets (e.g. Beckman & Haunschild, 2002) and was controlled using the 
measure of the natural log of the target firm’s total assets. The time between IPO and 
acquisition may influence the information available to acquirers and thus affect 
premiums, so Time Since IPO was controlled using the number of years between the 
target’s IPO and the acquisition announcement.   
Various characteristics of an acquisition may also affect premiums and thus were 
controlled. Deal Size may influence acquisition premiums (Beckman & Haunschild, 
2002; Reuer et al., 2012) and was measured as the natural log of the transaction value. 
Previous evidence suggests that a size bias may exist for acquisitions such that acquirer 
gains tend to be greater when the target is large, thus possibly influencing premiums 
(Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). Therefore, following tradition in the acquisition 
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literature, the Relative Size of the target to the acquirer is also included as a measure of 
the ratio of the target’s total assets to the acquirer’s total assets (Laamanen & Keil, 
2008). Also, premiums have been found to vary according to the method of payment 
used because stock payment can be a signal of a higher risk deal than cash payment. 
Thus, Payment Method is captured as a three-point ordinal scale where 1 represents a 
cash only sale, 2 represents a cash and stock sale, and 3 represents a stock only sale 
(Schijven & Hitt, 2012). The presence of investment advisors by either the target or the 
acquirer may also influence acquisition premiums. Thus, I control for the number of 
Target Investment Advisors and the number of Acquirer Investment Advisors as a count 
of external advisors present as reported by Thomson One (Schijven & Hitt, 2012).  
 While I examine the moderating role of environmental dynamism, I also control 
for the other environmental dimensions. Munificence captures the availability of 
resources in a focal industry. Previous evidence suggests that the munificence of an 
environment may affect the prevalence and the performance of acquisitions (Wan & Yiu, 
2009). This work suggests that in more munificent environments, premiums may be 
higher as compared to less munificent environments. Therefore, I control for 
environmental munificence as a measure of the log-transformation of net sales for each 
firm in a series of five-year panels (Keats & Hitt, 1988). Complexity captures the 
inequalities among rivals within an industry and is positively associated with uncertainty 
(Boyd, 1995). Further, complex environments are associated with greater information-
processing requirements for firms (Dess & Beard, 1984) which may influence the 
salience of gestalt characteristics. Following previous work, this variables is measured 
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using a Herfindahl index (Boyd, 1995). Differences in premiums have also been found to 
vary if the industry is high- or low-technology, with premiums being higher in high-
technology industries (Laamanen, 2007; Reuer et al., 2012). Industries defined with two-
digit SIC codes of 28, 35, 36, 38, 48, 73, 80, and 87 are regarded as high-technology 
industries (Laamanen, 2007). Thus, High-Technology Industry is equal to 1 if a target 
firm operates in one of these defined industries, and 0 otherwise.   
 Finally, because I analyze panel data, I include year fixed effects to control for 
the unobserved heterogeneity (Certo & Semadeni, 2006) further reducing potential 
endogeneity concerns (Studenmund, 2010; Schijven & Hitt, 2012).  
 
Analyses 
 My multi-industry data contains a nested structure such that there are multiple 
firms present in the sample within a single industry. Because competitive norms and 
premiums vary across industries (Ferrier, 2001; Laamanen, 2007), it is important to 
account for both within-industry and between-industry differences in the data. Further, 
due to the nesting of the data, the observations cannot be assumed to be independent 
from one another, thus violating one of the assumptions of ordinary least squares 
regression. For these reasons, I use hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to estimate my 
theoretical model.  
HLM provides a statistical technique for investigating relationships across 
different hierarchical levels (Hofmann, 1997). In other words, HLM allows for the 
influence of industry characteristics to be accounted for in firm-level variables, such as 
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acquisition premium. More specifically, HLM controls for potential autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity by recognizing the partial interdependence of observations and 
explicitly modeling both firm- and industry-level residuals. To do this, HLM 
simultaneously estimates two models: one modeling the relationships within each of the 
lower level (firm) units, and a second model accounting for how these relationships vary 
between groups (industries) (Hoffmann, 1997). Thus, HLM allows me to accurately 
accommodate the non-independence of my data while also efficiently estimating both 
within-industry and between-industry effects. The statistical package Stata 12 is used for 
all analyses.   
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
 
Results 
Table B1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations for the dependent, 
independent, and control variables. The average one week premium in my sample is 
42.49 percent, with a variance of 62.47 percent.  
Variance inflation factor (VIF) scores were calculated using ordinary least 
squares regression (OLS) for my full model to check for multicollinearity. All individual 
VIF scores are well below the common threshold of 10, with the highest VIF score at 
5.57 for the first year fixed effect, and all other variables below a more conservative 
guideline of 51. The average of all VIF scores is 2.79. These results suggest that 
multicollinearity is not a problem; however, all independent variables used in creating 
interactions terms were mean-centered to ease interpretations and reduce non-essential 
multicollinearity (Dalal & Zickar, 2012). Further, all significance tests in the models 
reflect a two-tailed test.  
Using OLS regression again, further diagnostics were run to test for the presence 
of heteroskedasticity. The -hettest- procedure as a postestimation test (Stata, 2012) 
rejected the null hypothesis of constant variance in my errors and indicated the need to 
use robust standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity in all models.  
                                                          
1 An alternative model using a categorical year control variable, as opposed to dummy variables for year 
fixed effects, had VIF scores all below the conservative threshold of 5 with an average VIF of 1.78. The 
results were substantially unchanged as reported in Table B4, Model 4.  
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Table B2 presents the results of the HLM models testing hypotheses 1-5. The 
analyses were done and are presented in a step-wise fashion in Models 1 – 8. Model 1 
presents the control variable model, while Model 2 presents the main effects model. 
Model 3 presents all interaction terms, while Models 4 – 8 present the main effects 
model and some of the interaction terms, broken up by the variable of focus. For 
example, Model 4 presents all of the competitive similarity interactions, while Model 7 
presents all of the dynamism interactions.  
Hypothesis 1 states that there is a positive relationship between competitive 
simplicity and acquisition premium. In Model 2 of Table B2, the coefficient of 
competitive simplicity is positive and statistically significant (39.941, p < 0.01), 
providing support for hypothesis 1.  
Hypothesis 2 states there is a positive relationship between competitive similarity 
and acquisition premiums. While the coefficient for competitive similarity in Model 2 of 
Table 2 is statistically significant (p < 0.05), it is also negative (-27.824) which is in the 
opposite direction of that hypothesized. Thus, hypothesis 2 does not receive support.   
Hypothesis 3 states there is a positive relationship between competitive 
predictability and acquisition premiums. In Model 2 of Table B2, the coefficient for 
competitive predictability is insignificant (p > 0.10), thus hypothesis 3 does not receive 
support.  
Hypothesis 4a, 4b, and 4c suggest that the relatedness of the buyer and target 
firms negatively moderates the positive relationships between competitive simplicity, 
similarity, and predictability and acquisition premium such that these relationships 
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become less positive when firm relatedness is greater. Model 3 in Table 2 provides the 
most conservative test of all interaction hypotheses, and none of the interaction 
coefficients between competitive similarity, simplicity, predictability, and firm 
relatedness are statistically significant (p > 0.10). Further, in Models 4 – 6, the 
interaction coefficients between the competitive repertoire characteristic and firm 
relatedness are also statistically insignificant. Finally, in Model 8, including only the 
firm relatedness interaction terms, the coefficients are statistically insignificant (p > 
0.10), except for the interaction between competitive similarity and firm relatedness 
which is negative and marginally statistically significant (p < 0.10). Thus, with no 
coefficients for interaction terms statistically significant across any of the models, 
hypothesis 4b and 4c are not supported. For hypothesis 4a, with only one interaction 
term being marginally statistically significant in Model 8, and the remaining interaction 
coefficients being statistically insignificant in the more conservative Model 3, I conclude 
that the results also do not provide support for hypothesis 4a.  
Hypothesis 5a, 5b, and 5c suggest that environmental dynamism positively 
moderates the positive relationships between competitive simplicity, similarity, and 
predictability and acquisition premium such that these relationships become more 
positive when dynamism increases. Model 3 in Table 2 provides the most conservative 
test of all interaction hypotheses, and none of the interaction coefficients between 
competitive similarity, simplicity, predictability, and dynamism are statistically 
significant (p > 0.10). Further, in looking at Models 4 – 6, the interaction coefficients 
between the competitive repertoire characteristic and dynamism are also statistically 
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insignificant. Finally, in Model 7, which includes only the interaction terms for 
dynamism, none of the interaction coefficients are statistically significant. Thus, 
hypotheses 5a, 5b, and 5c do not receive support.  
 
Supplementary Analyses 
Alternative Dependent Variable Operationalization. I chose a one week time frame for 
my calculation of acquisition premium in order to minimize possible other influences on 
stock price while not capturing any influence from early information regarding the 
acquisition announcement. However, I also tested my full model using acquisition 
premiums calculated both 1 day and 4 weeks prior to announcement. Identical to my 
main analysis, all models use HLM analysis and have robust standard errors. 
Table B3 presents the results of these robustness checks with Model 1 serving as 
the main effects model at 1 week. Model 2 presents the results for acquisition premiums 
calculated 1 day prior to announcement and Model 3 presents premiums calculated 4 
weeks prior to announcement. Competitive simplicity remains positive across all of the 
models and is statistically significant (p < 0.01) in Model 1 and Model 2. Conversely, 
competitive similarity remains negative across all three models and is statistically 
significant (p< 0.05) in Model 1 and Model 3. Competitive predictability, firm 
relatedness as a moderator, and environmental dynamism as a moderator, all remain 
statistically insignificant (p > 0.05) across all of the models. Thus, my results remain 
relatively consistent across various operationalizations of acquisition premium, but early 
and later announcements seem to be influenced by factors external to my model.  
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Overspecification Sensitivity Analysis. After all of my sample criteria were met and 
missing data were excluded, the final sample size was 129 firms. Considering I have 12 
control variables, as well as 10 year fixed effects controls, in addition to my 5 
independent variables, it is possible that I might be overspecifying my model. 
Specifically, there are 27 total variables in the model which is above the rule of thumb of 
10 observations per variable. Thus, in Table B4 I test a variety of partial models to see 
the consistency of my independent variables. As done in my main analysis, all models 
use HLM analysis and have robust standard errors.  
First, I test a baseline of only my independent variables with no controls in 
Model 1. Competitive simplicity remains positive and statistically significant (p < 0.05) 
and competitive similarity is negative and statistically insignificant. Competitive 
predictability becomes negative and marginally statistically significant (p < 0.10).  
Next, in Table B4, I compare models using 10 dummy variables for each year 
(denoted by year fixed effects included, Models 5 – 7) with models that use an 
alternative time control: one variable, Year, that ranges from 2000-2010, (Models 2-4). 
Thus, the only differences between Model 2 and Model 5, Model 3 and Model 6, and 
Model 4 and Model 7, is the use of a single variable year control or year fixed effect 
controls.   
Following the recommendations of Becker (2005), Carlson and Wu (2012), and 
the recent work of Gamache, McNamara, Mannon, and Johnson (2014), I also tested 
models using the “when in doubt, leave them out” (Carlson & Wu, 2012: 413) strategy 
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for control variables (Models 3 and 6). In these models, if a control variable was not 
significantly related with the dependent variable or was not significantly related with any 
other study variable, it was left out of the model. Thus, the controls included in these 
models are time (either categorical or dummy variables), Target Performance, Acquirer 
Performance, Target Firm Size, Deal Size, Payment Method, and Hi-Tech Industry.   
Finally, I tested the full model with all controls using both the single variable 
year control (Model 4) and the year fixed effects (Model 7). Model 7 in Table B4 is 
identical to Model 2 in Table B2, the main effect model in the HLM results.  
In every model in Table B4, the coefficient for competitive simplicity remains 
positive and statistically significant, indicating that this result testing hypothesis 1 is 
robust to possible model overspecification. The negative effects for competitive 
similarity are largely consistent across the models, but becomes only marginally 
significant when a single variable year control is used (Models 2 – 4). The coefficient for 
competitive predictability largely remains negative and insignificant across all models. 
Thus, I conclude that my results are robust to possible overspecification.  
 
Sample Selection Bias Analysis. It is possible that my sample may exhibit selection bias 
because not all recent IPO firms choose to be acquired. Sample selection may be an 
issue if it causes the error to be correlated with an explanatory variable (Wooldridge, 
2002). While acquisition premium studies have generally not addressed this concern, 
there have been a few recent exceptions. Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005) did not find 
evidence of selection bias; and similarly, Reuer et al., (2012) was unable to reject the 
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null of no sample selection bias, suggesting that selection bias was not a concern 
regarding the robustness of their results.  
To investigate this potential issue I use a two-stage Heckman (1979) model as 
suggested by Bascle (2008) and Hamilton and Nickerson (2003). A probit first stage 
model is used to estimate the inverse Mills ratio for the dummy selection variable of a 
firm being acquired within five years of IPO (1) or not (0). To estimate this model, I 
collected data on IPO firms in the same industries as firms in my sample that were not 
acquired within the studied time frame. The variables used in this first stage model to 
predict acquisition but are not included in the second stage are Industry M&A Activity as 
a count of all acquisitions in a given year and whether or not the target firm was Listed 
on a Major Exchange (NYSE or NASDAQ) (Reuer et al., 2012). The results are 
presented in Table B5.  
While it is common that the second stage model variables are a subset of the 
selection equation (Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003), in this instance, that is not possible as 
not all variables used in the second stage model exist for non-sample firms. Specifically, 
because a variety of my control variables in the second stage equation include acquirer 
and deal characteristics, these variables do not exist for IPO firms that have not been 
acquired. Thus, my selection equation uses all control variables that are not acquirer or 
deal related along with Industry M&A Activity and Major Exchange. This decision 
follows previous research that excludes variables in the first stage that are used in the 
second stage because they are unknown or do not exist for non-sample firms (Mulotte, 
2014). While my sample data does exhibit heteroskedasticity and thus I have used robust 
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standard errors in all previous analyses, for a Heckman two stage analysis, Heckman 
standard errors must be utilized and are the default for the -heckman- procedure (Stata, 
2012). Thus, in the HLM analysis in Model 1, robust standard errors are used, but in the 
Heckman analyses in Model 2 – 4, Heckman standard errors are utilized.  
Further, while I used performance and size measures for the target and acquirer 
firms for 12 months prior to the acquisition announcement gathered from Thomson One 
database in my main model, in this sample selection model, I use performance and size 
characteristics obtained from Compustat for the year prior to the acquisition 
announcement. The change from the more precise 12 month prior measure to the less 
precise, but largely overlapping, fiscal year prior to announcement operationalization for 
size and performance of IPO firms, is once again for uniformity between acquired and 
non-acquired IPO firms. Model 1 in Table B5 is identical to the HLM main effects 
Model 2 in Table B2, except Model 1 in Table B5 uses the fiscal-year prior 
measurements as opposed to the measurements 12 months prior to the announcement. As 
seen in Model 1 of Table B5, results are consistent across both types of firm size and 
performance operationalizations.  
Also, due to the panel nature of the IPO firm data and the cross-sectional nature 
of the acquisition data, I ran a variety of Heckman models to see if the results were 
robust across different aggregations. Specifically, I collected firm-year data for all firms 
that underwent IPO between 2000 and 2010, whether or not they were acquired. For 
non-sample firms (firms that underwent IPO but were not acquired within 5 years), I 
needed to choose a single firm-year to use for the selection model. Possibly due in part 
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to the lack of attention sample selection issues have received in acquisition premium 
research, there were no prior examples to follow in choosing how to simplify my data 
for the selection model. Thus, I tried a few different models to examine the consistency 
of my results.  
Model 2 presents the results for a Heckman two stage analysis using only the 
data from a non-acquired firm’s fifth year after IPO. In other words, if a firm that 
underwent IPO was not acquired within 5 years, its data from the fifth year after IPO 
was used. Model 3 presents results for a Heckman two-stage analysis that the selection 
variables of non-acquired firms were averaged across their first five years after IPO. 
Finally, Model 4 shows the results of Heckman two stage model when the non-sample 
firms were acquired, but not within 5 years. Because non-sample firms were required to 
be acquired for this model, allowing for a comparison of acquisitions announced within 
5 years of IPO versus acquisitions announced more than 5 years after IPO, there are 
significantly fewer non-sample firms in this analysis than the previous two models.  
Regardless of which model is considered, the inverse mills ratio is statistically 
insignificant in all three analyses. Thus, similar to the findings by Gaspar et al (2005) 
and Reuer et al. (2012), there is no evidence for selection bias in my sample.  
While the results in Table B5 are consistent and most relevant to possible sample 
selection issues in my sample, I also tried to examine if there were any differences 
between my sample, which only consisted of completed acquisitions, and acquisitions 
that were announced but eventually withdrawn. Because I am only examining 
announced acquisitions, and comparing completed versus failed acquisitions, I use size 
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and performance data from the 12 months prior to announcement provided by the 
Thomson One database. 
Table B6 presents the results of Heckman models comparing failed versus 
completed acquisitions. Model 1 reports the results for firms that announced within 5 
years of IPO but did not complete the acquisition as compared to my sample of firms 
that announced within 5 years of IPO and did complete the acquisition. Model 2 relaxes 
the 5 year limit for non-sample firms in order to increase the number of non-sample 
observations. Thus, Model 2 presents the results for firms that underwent an IPO and 
announced an acquisition between 2000 and 2010, but not necessarily within 5 years of 
their IPO, and did not complete the acquisition. My sample remains the same: firms that 
completed an acquisition that was announced within 5 years of their IPO.  
Consistent with results reported in Table B5, across all models the inverse mills 
ratio is statistically insignificant, suggesting that there is no evidence of selection bias in 
my sample.  
 
Alternative Measure of Competitive Predictability. The primary results presented in all 
of the tables use a measure of competitive predictability based on the Levenshtein 
distance scores from optimal matching analysis. I investigated several alternative 
measures, but all proved either to show consistent results, or were unsuitable due to 
severe multicollinearity concerns.  
As opposed to using a log transformation of the unstandardized Levenshtein 
distance score, I investigated using the unstandardized measure without a log 
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transformation and found the results were substantively unchanged. I also investigated 
using the standardized Levenshtein distance score, where the distance score is calculated 
as a proportion of the INDEL costs to the total number of elements in the referent 
sequence. Again, the results were substantively unchanged.    
Finally, I investigated using a completely different measure of unpredictability. 
While Levenshtein distance scores have been previously used in competitive dynamics 
research (Ferrier, 2001; Rindova et al., 2010), they are heavily dependent on the 
assignment of substitution scores (INDEL costs). In other words, researchers must assign 
a cost to substituting a new product action with a capacity action, or an acquisition 
action with a pricing action, all with respect to other actions. While it is obvious the cost 
of substituting a pricing action with a marketing action should be quite low as compared 
to substituting a pricing action with a legal action, the similarity or difference of such 
substitutions must be quantified at the discretion of the researcher. Further, this analysis 
is heavily influenced by the length, or number of actions used in the preceding sequence 
(t-1) instead of being based upon all possible actions. While I endeavored to use the 
most neutral and objective assignment of INDEL costs, and used a log-transformation of 
the measure to reduce the influence of length in my main analysis, some concerns 
remain with this measure.  
Based on the discussion above, the Shannon entropy index may be better suited 
for measuring competitive predictability than Levenshtein distance scores in this study 
because it maintains consistency in the gestalt operationalizations as well as removes the 
subjectivity of substitution costs. The assumption driving the unpredictability behind the 
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Shannon index is that the greater the range of categories, and the more equally 
distributed the characters (in this case actions) within the categories, the more difficult it 
is to predict which category of action will appear next (Connelly et al., 2015; Shannon, 
1948). The Shannon index is calculated as follows: 
𝑆 =  ∑ 𝑝𝑖 ln 𝑝𝑖 / ln (𝑖)
𝑅
𝑖=1
 
where pi is the proportion of competitive actions belonging to the ith competitive action 
category. This index ranges from a high of 1 when all types of competitive actions are 
equally common and thus most unpredictable and approaches zero as actions become 
more concentrated and therefore easier to predict correctly. While the Shannon index is 
similar to a Herfindahl index in that it captures the concentration of categories, as a 
measure of entropy it specifically is focused on capturing the average unpredictability in 
a random variable given all possible categories. Using this measure as a base, 
competitive predictability is calculated using the following formula: 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 1 −  ∑ 𝑝𝑖 ln 𝑝𝑖 / ln (𝑖)
𝑅
𝑖=1
 
This operationalization allows for higher values to be associated with greater levels of 
predictability while lower values are associated with lower levels of predictability. 
Unfortunately the similarity in variance with a Herfindahl index is too great to make this 
measure suitable in my models. Specifically, the correlation between the Shannon index 
and competitive simplicity (calculated using a Herfindahl index) is greater than 0.90 
resulting in severe multicollinearity concerns.  
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Alternative Measure of Firm Relatedness. Despite its use in many prior works (e.g. 
Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Finkelstein & Haleblian, 2002; Laamanen & Keil, 2007; 
Schijven & Hitt, 2012), the categorical approach to industry relatedness between 
acquirer and target is admittedly a coarse grained operationalization for firm relatedness. 
Specifically, this measure fails to capture the level of diversification for each firm. If an 
acquirer was heavily diversified, even though it’s corporate SIC code may be different 
than a target’s, one of the acquirer’s businesses may be much more closely related. Thus, 
the acquirer may have a better understanding and ability to evaluate the target than the 
SIC measure would suggest.  
 To examine this issue further, I calculated an alternative firm relatedness 
measure by using the difference between the Jacquemin and Berry (1979) entropy 
diversification measures for the target and acquirer. This measure captures the level of 
diversity within a corporation and when compared between a target and acquirer, 
captures the level of difference between the two firms. Total entropy equals 0 for a 
single business firm and rises with the extent of diversity. In subtracting a target firm’s 
diversification measure from an acquiring firm, the difference is small if both firms 
share similar levels of diversification and rises with increases in the diversification level 
differences between the firms.  
Table B7 reports the descriptive statistics and correlations for all independent, 
dependent, and control variables when the diversification operationalization of firm 
relatedness is used. The average difference in diversification level is 0.31 with a standard 
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deviation of 0.56. In testing for multicollinearity in my main effects model using this 
measurement, the VIF scores are high. When the variables used in interactions are mean 
centered, there are six VIF scores above 10.00, with the highest at 16.59. The average 
VIF score is 5.58. These scores are well above the accepted threshold of 10, not to 
mention the more conservative recommendation of 5 as a maximum VIF, and indicate 
there is an issue with multicollinearity in the model when using the diversification 
measure of firm relatedness. Despite this concern, the results of the HLM analysis using 
robust standard errors and the diversification measure of firm relatedness remain 
consistent with previous findings.  
 
Robustness to Inclusion of Firm Competitive Activity. I also investigated if my results 
were robust to the inclusion of another control variable, firm competitive activity. This 
variable is a count of all competitive actions taken by a firm in a given year. Inclusion of 
this variable allows for any variance associated with the overall total volume of actions 
to be differentiated from the variance in the patterns of competitive behavior captured by 
simplicity, similarity, and predictability.  
Table B8 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations for my dependent, 
independent, and control variables, including firm competitive activity. Table B9 
presents the HLM results for the control (Model 1), main effect (Model 2), and 
interaction (Model 3) empirical models. Competitive simplicity remains positive and 
statistically significant (p < 0.05), competitive similarity remains negative and 
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statistically significant (p < 0.10), and competitive predictability remains not statistically 
significant, leaving the results substantively unchanged from Table B2.  
In summary, to test the robustness of my results I investigated alternative 
measures for acquisition premiums, competitive predictability, and firm relatedness, and 
found my results to be substantially unchanged across all operationalizations. Further, I 
investigated if my models might be overspecified and found that the results are robust to 
using year fixed effects versus a single variable to control for time. Also, in following 
the “when in doubt, leave it out” control variable recommendations of Becker (2005) 
and Carlson and Wu (2012), I found my results remain essentially unchanged in the 
models with the omission of various control variables if they were not significantly 
related with the dependent variable or had no correlation with any other study variable 
(Table B4, Models 3 and 6). There was a possibility that sample selection bias might be 
present in my sample, but multiple different analyses failed to find evidence of such a 
bias, which is in agreement with previous studies (e.g. Gaspar et al., 2005; Reuer et al., 
2012). Finally, I also investigated the influence of another control variable, total firm 
competitive activity, and found my results to be unchanged.  
Overall, the supplementary analyses suggest that the positive and statistically 
significant finding of competitive simplicity, the negative and statistically significant 
finding for competitive similarity, and the statistically insignificant finding for 
competitive predictability are robust across various operationalizations and models.   
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CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 In this dissertation, I integrate signaling and holistic processing theories to 
examine how the sequence characteristics of a target firms’ competitive actions over 
time can influence its acquisition premium. Current research suggests that premiums are 
largely driven by the acquirer’s valuation of anticipated synergies with the target firm 
(Hitt et al., 2012) which are highly subjective and subject to considerable information 
asymmetries (Coff, 1999; Reuer et al., 2012). To better understand how these 
information asymmetries are alleviated, research has focused on signaling theory. 
Based on the foundational relationships between the signaler, the signal, the 
receiver, and feedback, signaling theory has been an important theoretical framework 
used in research on strategy, entrepreneurship, and human resource management, among 
others, over the past two decades (Connelly et al., 2011). Despite these many works, 
overall applications of signaling theory have remained similar and largely cross-
sectional in nature. In fact, Connelly et al. (2011) suggest that while the basic 
components of signaling theory are generally used to explain foundational signaling 
relationships in the management literature, there is less work “aiming to extend the 
boundaries of what we know about signaling to develop a more comprehensive theory 
that scholars might use to explain a broader range of social and organizational 
phenomena” (Connelly et al., 2011: 56). While signaling theory is dynamic and 
longitudinal, most signaling studies have examined the effects of individual signals 
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immediately preceding key decisions. In fact, a key criticism of signaling theory 
research is the emphasis on signals that act as single “snapshots” (Davila et al., 2003).  
However, previous research in holistic processing theory and sensemaking 
suggests that receivers process information that is not only current, but also historical, 
and from this often overwhelming amount of available information, search for patterns 
to enhance their understanding (Weick, 1995; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). Thus, I 
suggest that in order to continue to develop our understanding of the signaling process 
we need to extend the time period of focus from individual signals to sequences of 
signals transmitted over time.  
I develop theory to predict that target firms with competitive action repertoires 
exhibiting high simplicity, similarity, and predictability will be associated with high 
acquisition premiums. This logic is consistent with evidence from holistic processing 
theory and in management research that shows the presence of easily discernable 
patterns in complex information sequences can increase positive evaluations (Lee & 
Labroo, 2004; Navis & Glynn, 2011; Rindova et al., 2010). Specifically, I explain that 
characteristics of competitive repertoires have high visibility, strength, and cost, and thus 
serve as a signal to convey unique information that is distinct from the information from 
each individual action. Further, I suggest that the salience of these gestalt competitive 
repertoire characteristics is influenced by the target and buyer’s relatedness and the 
uncertainty in the environment.  
My results support the underlying assertion in my model, that competitive action 
repertoire characteristics influence acquisition premiums, but I find conflicting effects 
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depending on the specific characteristics. In particular, I find strong and consistent 
evidence that target firms exhibiting a simple competitive action repertoire are 
associated with a premium increase of 40 percent. I also find that target firms with 
competitive action repertoires similar to other firms in their industry are consistently 
associated with changes in acquisition premiums, but the relationship is negative. 
Further, I do not find any moderating effects, suggesting that the salience and 
interpretability of a target firm’s competitive repertoire characteristics are not influenced 
by environmental dynamism or acquirer and target firm industry relatedness. There are a 
variety of theoretical and empirical explanations for these specific findings that I discuss 
in the next section; however, in the remainder of this section I focus on the three primary 
contributions of the dissertation as a whole.  
First, this work extends signaling theory by introducing the idea of gestalt 
characteristics in signaling sequences over time that can convey information that is 
distinct from the information sent by individual signals. Focusing on characteristics of 
competitive action repertoires as signals addresses the concern of frequency or repetition 
in signaling (Janney & Folta, 2003; Park & Mezias, 2005). Further, by integrating work 
from holistic processing theory, I show that pattern characteristics can have high 
visibility. Finally, by specifically focusing on characteristics of competitive action 
sequences, I demonstrate that these characteristics can have high signal strength due to 
the reduction in noise and expense of decoupling the signal from the signaling firm’s 
resources and capabilities. Overall, this logic extends previous work in signaling theory 
that has examined individual signals prior to an event, such as in hiring (e.g. Ehrhart & 
 78 
 
Zeigert, 2005; Highhouse, Thornbury & Little, 2007), IPO investment (e.g. Bruton, 
Chahine & Filatotchev, 2009; Certo, 2003; Zimmerman, 2008), and strategy and 
stakeholder decisions (e.g. Goranova et al., 2007; Zhang & Wiersema, 2009) by 
considering current and historical information collectively.   
 A second major contribution of this dissertation is in exploring contextual 
contingencies of competitive behavior. Overwhelmingly, current evidence suggests 
complexity, deviance, and unpredictability lead to positive firm outcomes such as 
performance (Ferrier, 2001; Ndofor et al., 2011), firm reputation (Basdeo et al., 2006), 
market share gains (Caves & Ghemawat, 1992), and industry leader dethronement 
(Ferrier et al., 1999). However, I suggest that while complexity, deviance, and 
unpredictability may enable a firm to remain ahead of rivals, these patterns obscure the 
value proposition of a firm that desires to be acquired in the M&A market. I find that in 
the context of the M&A market, from the perspective of the target firm, engaging in a 
simple repertoire can lead to a 40 percent increase in premiums received, on average. 
While I did find the opposite effect for competitive similarity (representing a 28 percent 
decrease in premiums), this study suggests that patterns of competitive behavior can 
produce widely varying outcomes depending on the context and motivation of the focal 
firm.  
 Third, this work integrates competitive behavior and premium research to 
contribute important insights to our understanding of target firm behavior in the M&A 
market. While much of the work in M&A research focuses on buyer characteristics 
(Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 2009) and learning (Haleblian & 
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Finkelstein, 1999; Meschi & Metais, 2013), there is a general consensus that the better 
the selected target fits with a buyer, the greater the acquisition performance (King, 
Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 2004). However, despite our enhanced understanding of the 
important role target selection plays in acquisition success, there remains a lack of focus 
on the target in an acquisition. This perspective has carried over into premium research, 
as evidenced by the focus on causes of overpayment such as managerial hubris 
(Hayward & Hambrick, 1997), misrepresentation and opportunism (Balakrishnan & 
Koza, 1993; Gilson & Schwarts, 2005), and agency issues with intermediaries (Porrini, 
2006; Stouraitis, 2003). This dissertation builds on previous studies by Graebner (2009), 
Heeley et al. (2006), and Reuer and colleagues (Reuer et al., 2012; Ragozzino & Reuer, 
2011) by focusing on the influence target firms have in the acquisition process, and 
specifically how target firms can increase their acquisition premiums. More generally, I 
build on M&A research by integrating work from competitive dynamics to suggest and 
find that the characteristics of a target firm’s current corporate-level competitive patterns 
can influence acquisitions premiums.  
 
Specific Hypotheses and Implications 
One of the major contributions of this work discussed above is showing the 
contextual contingencies for competitive repertoire characteristics, specifically in 
suggesting and finding that these characteristics can have opposite effects for firms in 
the M&A market from what is currently established in the literature. Specifically, 
hypothesis 1 suggests that competitive repertoire simplicity is positively associated with 
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acquisition premiums. This hypothesis is in stark contrast with a majority of the work on 
competitive repertoires that finds competitive complexity, the inverse of simplicity, to be 
positively related to a variety of positive firm outcomes (Ferrier, 2001; Ndofor et al., 
2011). The significant and positive finding for the relationship between simplicity and 
premium in this study is robust across a variety of models and remains a large effect, at a 
40 percent increase in premium, on average.  
 This finding has implications for the stream of work on competitive simplicity, 
finding that evidence for the benefits of engaging in a complex repertoire is not only 
time dependent (Connelly et al., 2015; Miller, 1993), but also context dependent. This 
adds nuance to the current literature that overwhelmingly finds the benefits of 
competitive complexity. Specifically, my finding relates to some of the original work on 
firm simplicity, referring more broadly to organizational structure and strategy as 
opposed to focusing only on competitive actions (Miller, 1993), by suggesting that firms 
engaging in a simple repertoire may experience the benefits of focus in core 
competencies and strategic (i.e. rare, valuable, nonsubstituable, and inimitable) resources 
(Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989) that are defensible from being imitated by rivals 
(Lenoard-Barton, 1992; Lippman & Rumelt, 1982; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990).  
Furthermore, when considering the importance of conveying information to a 
market while simultaneously protecting that information from appropriation by rivals 
(Ndofor & Levitas, 2004), a simple competitive repertoire offers the benefit of being a 
visible and strong signal to potential buyers. Thus, my finding provides new insights into 
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our understanding of competitive repertoires and how firms can simultaneously signal 
information about value creation and protect their proprietary knowledge.  
 Hypothesis 2 similarly suggests that another competitive repertoire characteristic, 
competitive similarity, is also associated with an increase in acquisition premium. 
However, while the result was significant across many models, it was always in the 
opposite direction than predicted. In fact, competitive similarity was found to be related 
to a 28 percent decrease in premium, on average. This finding is surprising considering 
the benefits of a competitive repertoire pattern for signaling information and increasing 
processing fluency; however, it may speak to a possible disconnect in my theorizing 
between reducing information asymmetries and raising acquisition premiums.  
 In my hypothesis development, I suggest that reducing information asymmetries 
may lead to an increase in premiums because acquirers would be less likely to engage in 
premium discounting. However, from a buyer’s perspective, reducing information 
asymmetries simply leads to a better evaluation of a target, which in turn may either 
increase or decrease the premium. In other words, lower information asymmetries in 
target selection may help the acquirer select a target more quickly, and possibly increase 
post-acquisition performance, but lower information asymmetries may not necessarily 
lead to an increase in premiums. The variance seen in premiums, 62.47 percent in my 
sample, suggests that while some targets may be underpriced and reducing information 
asymmetries can increase their premium, the opposite is also likely true. Some target 
firms may benefit from information asymmetries in the selection process and decreasing 
those uncertainties leads to a more accurate pricing that reduces premiums. 
 82 
 
My results suggest that a target firm exhibiting greater competitive similarity 
results in a lower premium, likely reflecting a more accurate pricing of the target due to 
reduced information asymmetries. A firm that exhibits high similarity behaves in 
accordance with industry competitive norms and thus is offering a value creation 
capability that is less rare in the industry. Further, potential buyers may be interested in 
changing the status quo in their new market, and thus may take bold moves and act out 
of the ordinary for that industry’s competitive norms. Chen and colleagues (2010) found 
that firms seeking to change the status quo in an established market often take bold 
moves in hopes to disrupt current industry leaders. Similarly, a cornerstone of strategic 
management research suggests that there is value in differentiation, specifically doing 
different things, or doing the same things differently (Porter, 1980). Also, Penrose 
(1959) suggests that it is the heterogeneity of actions taken by a firm that yields each 
firm’s unique character and allows it to provide different kinds of services. In other 
words, since competitive similarity is measured as compared to the norms in an industry, 
a potential buyer may be receiving the signal and reducing the information asymmetries, 
but they value deviance, or doing the same things differently, as reflected in the robust 
negative relationship between competitive similarity and premium.   
 As the final direct hypothesis in this study, hypothesis 3 suggests that 
competitive predictability is positively associated with acquisition premium. Unlike 
competitive simplicity and similarity, competitive predictability is not consistently 
significant across the models tested herein. There could be a variety of empirical and 
theoretical reasons for this result. Empirically, competitive predictability is correlated 
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with competitive simplicity, at 0.47 (as reported in Table B1). While the VIF scores 
were well below the thresholds for concerns about multicollinearity, it is possible that 
some residual multicollinearity exists in the model that could be inflating the standard 
errors and increasing the possibility of a Type II error. Also, it is possible my model is 
influenced by low degrees of freedom that might be inflating my confidence intervals 
which is also associated with Type II error. With 27 variables in my full main effects 
model, a common heuristic suggests a minimum sample size of 5 to 8 times the number 
of variables, yielding a recommended sample size of 135. With 129 observations, my 
model only marginally satisfies this rule of thumb. Relatedly, because of the relatively 
low number of observations, the entire model might be subject to low power and thus 
higher Type II error. Specifically, the power for predictability is calculated as 0.26, 
much lower than the commonly desired 0.80. This calculation was done using the 
coefficient and standard errors associated with Model 2 of Table B2 and a two-tailed 
95% alpha following the recommendations of Scherbaum and Ferreter (2009) for a 
multilevel model. Thus, the lack of statistically significant findings could be due to high 
multicollinearity, low degrees of freedom, and low power, all associated with a high 
Type II error rate, leading to false negatives when in fact there is a relationship between 
predictability and premium. 
 Theoretically, competitive predictability may not be associated with acquisition 
premiums for the same reasons discussed earlier, that reducing information asymmetries 
may not be related to an increase in premiums. Considering the lack of significant effects 
for predictability across most of my models, a firm exhibiting competitive predictability 
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may be reducing information asymmetries, but these reductions may be leading to either 
an increase or a decrease in premiums across firms, thus washing out any effects seen 
across the entire sample. Another dependent variable, such as the variability in 
premiums, might be a better choice to illuminate if competitive predictability is 
consistently decreasing information asymmetries for potential acquirers.  
For example, various measures of post-acquisition performance, such as financial 
returns and innovation outputs might also illuminate this relationship as lower 
information asymmetries, such as found with firms exhibiting competitive predictability, 
should result in better target selection and thus increases in post-acquisition performance 
and patents. Further, the length of time between when a target firm undergoes an IPO 
and is acquired may be shorter for a firm with lower information asymmetries through 
the use of a predictable competitive repertoire. The more predictable the target firm’s 
competitive actions are over time, the less uncertainty there is for buyers regarding the 
target firm’s value proposition, and thus the more quickly buyers are able to evaluate and 
select the firm as a target. These relationships should remain in a single direction with 
the decrease in information asymmetries, as opposed to premiums, which may increase 
or decrease based on the more accurate evaluations afforded with lower uncertainties.  
Alternatively, the insignificance of the predictability to premium relationship 
may be due to the lack of interest of buying firms in allowing the target firm to continue 
operating as it was prior to the acquisition. Specifically, because of the benefits possible 
through new synergies, buying firms may anticipate and desire for target firm 
competitive behavior to change after acquisition. Thus, buyers may be less interested in 
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evaluating and paying greater premiums for either predictable or unpredictable 
competitive repertoires, as shown by the insignificance of the relationship between 
predictability and premium. In other words, acquiring firms may find the repertoire 
characteristic of predictability irrelevant to their target selection because they expect the 
competitive actions of the newly integrated firm to change due to new synergies and the 
buyer’s desire to change the acquired target firm’s market, regardless of the acquired 
target firm’s prior pattern.  
Hypothesis 4a, 4b, and 4c all suggest that the relatedness between the buyer and 
target firms negatively moderates the positive relationships between competitive 
simplicity, similarity, and predictability, and acquisition premium. The logic here 
suggests that as a potential buyer is more similar to a target, it is better able to 
understand current and historical information about the target, and thus may rely less on 
the positive evaluations generated through the presence of patterns. Across all models 
tested these interaction predictions receive no support. While consistent with the logic of 
my hypotheses, the categorical measure of firm relatedness based on similar SIC codes 
is coarse grained and may not provide the best operationalization of this variable. In fact, 
despite its prevalent use in M&A research (e.g., Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; 
Finkelstein & Haleblian, 2002), this measure is not significant in previous acquisition 
premium models using widely different samples (Laamanen, 2007; Laamanen & Keil, 
2008; Schijven & Hitt, 2012).  
Theoretically, the lack of support for my moderation hypotheses, and possibly for 
the lack of statistical significance in previous premium research, could again be due to 
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lower information asymmetries leading to both higher and lower premiums. In the 
hypothesis development, I assumed that the more related the buyer and target firms’ 
industries, the more likely the buyer would be able to evaluate and understand the value 
creation capability of the target firm (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1994; Singh & Montgomery, 
1987). Thus, I suggested that the relatedness of the acquirer and target firms would 
mitigate the effects of a target’s competitive pattern signaling. However, it is possible 
that instead of mitigating the effects of the firm’s competitive pattern signals, relatedness 
enhances these effects, as the greater the relatedness between a target and an acquirer, 
the more certainty the acquirer might have in pricing acquisition offers. But, this more 
accurate pricing may be either more positive, or more negative, leading to the 
insignificance of a directional relationship as found in my results. In other words, firm 
relatedness may further reduce information asymmetries surrounding a target in 
conjunction with a target’s competitive pattern signaling. Thus, greater firm relatedness 
may be associated with greater variance in acquisition premiums, as opposed to always 
mitigating the patterns’ effects.  
Additionally, a possible empirical explanation for this insignificance across many 
samples may be the difficulty in classifying a large diversified organization into a single 
SIC code. If the firm is operating in many different businesses, corporate SIC codes may 
not accurately reflect the organizations knowledge and familiarity with the business of a 
target firm. An alternative measure of firm relatedness was tested to help better capture 
the structural differences between buyers and targets as opposed to the industry 
relatedness. However, this measure caused high multicollinearity in my models, which 
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can produce biased estimates and large standard errors. An implication of my non-
finding, given the consistent non-findings in previous research, may suggest that while 
there seems a theoretical reason to expect industry similarity might influence acquisition 
premia, there is no supporting empirical evidence for a direct relationship. Instead, this 
linkage may be mediated by another mechanism, such as information asymmetries, that 
is confounding the results.  
Hypothesis 5a, 5b, and 5c suggest that environmental dynamism positively 
moderates the positive relationships between competitive simplicity, similarity, and 
predictability, and acquisition premium such that these relationships become more 
positive when dynamism increases. The interaction coefficients for dynamism in Table 
B2, Models 3 – 7 were all insignificant. Empirically, these results could be due to 
relatively low power increasing Type II errors as discussed above; but, considering the 
lack of significance in even the most simple of models (Table B4, Model 1), this non-
finding is not likely to change with greater observations. Also, the lack of significance 
for environmental dynamism may be due to the relatively low variance of dynamism in 
my sample. Specifically, with a mean of 0.03 and a variance of 0.03, there may not be 
enough variance to accurately determine differences in dynamism across acquisitions in 
my sample.  
Theoretically, the uncertainty associated with dynamism in the target firm’s 
industry may not be increasing the salience of repertoire characteristics as predicted 
because the three properties are less effective in dynamic environments. While I 
hypothesized that the increased ambiguity associated with a dynamic target firm 
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environment may lead buyers to seek and rely on patterns more (Whitson & Galinsky, 
2008), the value of the signals and the resources they represent may be altered in 
dynamic environments (Priem & Butler, 2001). For example, I suggested a target firm 
exhibiting a simple competitive repertoire might be signaling that their strategic 
resources are valuable, rare, nonsubstitutable, and difficult to imitate, and thus can 
sustain the firm’s competitive advantage. However, a signal of the presence of strategic 
resources may not be as effective in dynamic environments because acquirers might 
expect that these resources can be rendered obsolete rapidly. Thus, in dynamic 
environments the ability to sustain a simple competitive repertoire may be less favored 
than evidence of the ability to consistently generate new capabilities in order to maintain 
a competitive advantage. The advantages of similar and predictable competitive patterns 
may be also less effective in turbulent dynamic markets.  
Furthermore, while this study focused on dynamism in the target firm’s focal 
industry, it may be relevant to consider the uncertainty faced by the acquirer instead. 
Specifically, while I focused on the target’s perspective and environment, the buyer’s 
environment might have more of an influence on the salience of pattern characteristics 
than the target firm because the collection and evaluation of current and historical 
information about a potential target firm occurs in the acquirer’s industry as opposed to 
in the target’s industry. In other words, while the acquirer is entering the target’s 
environment through the acquisition, the signals of competitive repertoire patterns are 
being received and interpreted by the buyer in its own environment. 
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Limitations and Future Research 
 As with any study, this research is subject to some important limitations that 
might influence the generalizability and applicability of this work. First, this sample is 
from a single region, North America. This restriction reduces possible variations in the 
difficulty associated with understanding foreign targets in a cross-border acquisition, but 
it also reduces the generalizability of the results. Furthermore, in an effort to objectively 
assess and compare acquisition premiums across multiple firms and industries, only 
public target firms were considered. While there might be reason to expect that the 
uncertainty associated with acquisitions of private firms might cause greater attenuation 
of all available signals, it is difficult to develop an objective, financial evaluation of a 
private firm prior to an acquisition. Thus, it would have been impossible to compare the 
premiums received.  
 These sample restrictions, coupled with the desire to focus on entrepreneurial, 
high growth firms that may desire a profitable exit, led to an overall small sample size. 
With only 129 firms satisfying all of the sample criteria without any missing information 
across multiple independent, dependent, and control variables, there are possible issues 
with the statistical power of my models. Thus, it is possible some of my hypothesized 
relationships exist, but my sample and data were unable to demonstrate those 
relationships due to Type II error.  
 Third, and perhaps most importantly, this study did not directly test the 
recognition, use, and impact of signals – specifically competitive behavior patterns – in 
the decision making process of the acquirer. A common issue in research on strategic 
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decisions in firms (Hambrick, 2007), this inability to see inside the “black box” at the 
top of the firm requires future research to employ alternative approaches such as survey 
methods or coding meeting minutes (Tuggle, Schnatterly, & Johnson, 2010). Similarly, 
when considering a single outcome, such as acquisition premium, it should be 
recognized that this outcome was the product of multiple decisions resulting from the 
coordinated actions of many different individuals (Klein & House, 1995; Waldman, 
Ramierez, House, & Puranam, 2001). Thus, acquisition and premium research might 
benefit from greater attention to the team dynamics and decision making processes 
amongst a firm’s executives and its board of directors, such the work on TMT behavioral 
integration (e.g. Simsek, Veiga, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2005).  
 In addition to the opportunities provided by addressing these limitations, the 
theory and results presented in this dissertation suggest many promising areas for further 
research. First, as discussed earlier in regards to my non-findings, because reducing 
information asymmetries may lead to either an increase or a decrease in a target firm’s 
acquisition premium, there is an important opportunity to explore other dependent 
variables that might more consistently reflect the effects of reducing information 
asymmetries. For example, buyers that acquire target firms exhibiting simple, similar, 
and predictable competitive repertoires may experience better post-acquisition 
performance because of the reduced information asymmetries leading to improved target 
selection. (King et al., 2004).  
Also, future research could explore a portfolio approach to competitive behavior 
patterns. While multiple studies in competitive dynamics have considered various 
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repertoire characteristics (Ferrier, 2001; Ndofor et al., 2011; Rindova et al., 2010), none 
have considered how these characteristics might work together to influence outcomes. 
Specifically, given the positive influence of simplicity and negative influence of 
similarity, it would be valuable and interesting to explore if the interaction of simplicity 
and deviance has an additive effect for acquisition premium or if a firm signaling with 
these two patterns simultaneously mitigates premium effects. Also, despite competitive 
predictability’s non-significance, might it interact with simplicity or similarity enhance 
or mitigate the effects for a target firm’s received premium?  
 Future research focused on understanding the competitive patterns used by 
acquirers might also provide valuable insight to target selection research. Specifically, 
would a buyer have a higher evaluation of a target firm engaging in a simple repertoire if 
the buyer also engages in such a pattern of competitive behavior? Would similarity 
between buyer and target firms’ competitive patterns enhance the understanding and 
evaluation of these patterns? Also, could similar competitive patterns between the target 
and acquirer improve acquisition performance due to easier integration? In a similar 
vein, future research might explore if the similarity between the target’s and acquirer’s 
competitive patterns enhances the innovation outcomes of acquisitions.  
 In this dissertation, I focused on the competitive patterns at the corporate level of 
analysis, but considering the diversity of businesses that might exist within a single 
corporation, it might be interesting to examine the relatedness between target and 
acquirer competitive patterns at the business level. This examination may bring new 
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insights to the discussion of industry relatedness by providing additional understanding 
of the businesses involved in the acquisition.  
Another area of future research that might prove promising is a closer look at 
target and acquirer governance characteristics. While this study does not explore the 
causes of competitive patterns, it would be interesting to examine how governance 
characteristics could influence the emergence and management of competitive patterns. 
Research by Connelly and colleagues has shown that different types of institutional 
owners can influence the types of actions taken by firms (Connelly, Tihanyi, Certo & 
Hitt, 2010). Could different types of owners, such as institutional owners, family owners, 
etc., influence managers to use different types of competitive behavior patterns? 
Similarly, could different types of owners have an impact on which competitive patterns 
might be attenuated to in a potential target firm?  
 Finally, context was an important component of this research. While previous 
research has found that engaging in a simple competitive repertoire is associated with 
decreased performance (Ferrier, 2001; Ndofor et al., 2011), I suggested and found that in 
the M&A market, engaging in a simple repertoire is associated with a 40 percent 
increase in premium. While this is an important contingency for competitive dynamics, 
there are many more contingencies that can be explored. For example, could the impact 
of competitive patterns as signals change when either the acquirer or target industry is in 
decline? Also, acquisition performance has been linked to firms responding to the 
pressures associated with a M&A wave in an industry (Haleblian & Dykes, 2008); future 
research could explore how a target firm might best position itself during a M&A wave 
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relative to its rivals to extract the highest premium from a potential buyer. Lastly, the 
impact of competitive action patterns may extend beyond acquisitions to other corporate-
level strategies, such as alliances. How might the similarity or differences between two 
firms’ competitive behavior patterns impact alliance performance or innovation?  
 
Conclusion 
This dissertation integrates work on competitive behavior and acquisition 
premium research to extend signaling theory by suggesting that patterns in competitive 
repertoires can serve as unique signals for a target firm in the M&A market. My results 
suggest that, despite previous research finding negative effects on performance, target 
firms engaging in a simple competitive action repertoire are associated with a 40 percent 
increase in acquisition premiums. However, my results also suggest that competitive 
similarity is associated with a 28 percent decline in acquisition premiums on average. 
Also, while I propose buyer and environmental characteristics moderate the salience of 
competitive repertoire characteristics as signals, I find no supporting evidence for these 
effects. Overall, this research suggests that target firms are active participants in the 
M&A market and that patterns of competitive behavior can serve as complex signals to 
potential buyers. The novelty of considering patterns of competitive behavior as signals 
presents multiple opportunities for future research at both the business- and corporate- 
levels of analysis.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
Table B1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
 
 
 Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
(1) Premium (1 week) 42.49 62.47 1.00
(2) Target Performance -28.81 87.18 -0.04 1.00
(3) Acquirer Performance -14.33 130.62 0.11 0.47 1.00
(4) Target Firm Size 5.32 1.56 -0.18 0.33 0.04 1.00
(5) Time Since IPO 3.13 1.29 -0.07 0.07 0.09 -0.02 1.00
(6) Deal Size 5.50 1.80 -0.07 0.42 0.11 0.74 -0.03 1.00
(7) Relative Size 0.53 1.71 -0.12 0.00 -0.07 0.07 0.03 -0.19 1.00
(8) Payment Method 1.61 1.05 -0.01 -0.13 -0.15 0.11 -0.12 -0.05 0.14 1.00
(9) Target Investment Advisors 2.87 1.54 -0.02 0.22 0.02 0.43 0.00 0.54 -0.09 -0.02 1.00
(10) Acquirer Investment Advisors 2.62 1.86 -0.11 0.25 0.02 0.48 0.02 0.62 -0.10 0.04 0.48 1.00
(11) Environmental Munificence 0.11 0.10 0.03 -0.07 -0.07 0.10 -0.07 -0.01 0.01 0.16 0.13 0.03 1.00
(12) Environmental Complexity 0.20 0.16 -0.07 0.09 0.06 0.05 -0.09 -0.03 0.15 -0.11 -0.11 -0.07 -0.05 1.00
(13) High-Tech Industry 0.57 0.50 0.14 -0.17 -0.08 -0.34 -0.05 -0.08 -0.10 -0.19 -0.01 -0.04 -0.07 -0.24 1.00
(14) Competitive Simplicity 0.86 0.23 0.09 0.01 -0.01 -0.08 0.10 -0.11 0.01 -0.05 -0.13 -0.06 -0.01 0.05 -0.23 1.00
(15) Competitive Similarity 0.66 0.33 -0.13 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.13 0.07 0.06 0.14 -0.06 0.08 0.02 -0.08 -0.04 -0.17 1.00
(16) Competitive Predictability -0.27 0.65 -0.02 0.23 0.06 -0.18 0.08 -0.03 -0.05 -0.20 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 0.08 -0.04 0.47 -0.24 1.00
(17) Firm Relatedness 1.07 0.99 0.11 -0.07 0.08 -0.13 0.06 -0.16 -0.11 -0.05 -0.08 -0.06 0.01 -0.04 -0.11 0.11 -0.06 -0.05 1.00
(18) Environmental Dynamism 0.03 0.03 -0.08 0.12 0.06 0.28 0.09 0.16 0.03 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.12 -0.26 0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05
Correlations greater than |0.14| are significant at p < 0.05
N = 129
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Table B2: HLM Results 
 
DV: 1 Week Premium
Model  1 Model  2 Model  3 Model  4 Model  5 Model  6 Model  7 Model  8
 
Intercept      64.520 ** 16.457 13.114 16.224 19.919 12.753 20.377 10.245
Target Performance  -0.065 -0.021 -0.033 -0.021 -0.015 -0.031 -0.015 -0.037
Acquirer Performance          0.081 *** 0.084 *** 0.093 *** 0.086 *** 0.085 *** 0.089 *** 0.085 *** 0.094 ***
Target Firm Size     -11.362 ** -10.891 * -12.233 ** -10.762 * -11.709 * -11.274 ** -11.710 * -11.392 **
Time Since IPO  -1.625 -0.703 -0.924 -1.006 -0.923 -0.472 -0.864 -1.013
Deal Size   6.922 8.445 + 9.222 + 8.409 + 8.586 + 9.027 + 8.701 + 8.816 +
Relative Size  -0.679 -0.770 0.901 -0.980 -0.920 0.083 -1.125 1.426
Payment Method    0.601 6.879 7.082 6.890 7.352 6.314 7.080 7.078
Target Investment Advisors      4.671 + 6.052 * 6.288 + 5.820 + 5.978 * 6.149 * 5.881 + 6.523 *
Acquirer Investment Advisors   -2.267 -3.295 + -3.065 + -3.381 + -3.287 + -3.207 + -3.319 + -2.957
Environmental Munificence   -2.965 11.496 13.667 14.105 15.089 11.891 16.258 7.512
Environmental Complexity -31.426 -10.009 -4.906 -11.547 -5.598 -9.424 -6.552 -8.842
High-Tech Industry    15.701 * 23.688 ** 24.629 ** 24.202 ** 22.459 ** 25.338 ** 22.900 ** 25.169 **
Competitive Simplicity 39.914 ** 34.162 * 40.286 ** 34.417 * 40.169 ** 35.200 * 39.876 **
Competitive Similarity -27.824 * -27.526 * -26.205 * -28.676 * -27.685 + -29.058 * -26.514 +
Competitive Predictability -6.882 -6.704 -7.633 -7.819 -6.512 -8.150 -5.442
Firm Relatedness -0.440 -2.506 -0.540 -0.854 -0.783 -0.448 -2.510
Environmental Dynamism -127.492 -166.675 -75.710 -186.302 + -108.942 -176.348 -107.908
Competitive Similarity x Dynamism -16.369 265.032 34.595
Competitive Similarity x Firm Relatedness -2.738 -2.581 -2.449
Competitive Simplicity x Dynamism -639.605 -634.924 -633.864
Competitive Simplicity x Firm Relatedness -18.527 -5.883 -19.870+
Competitive Predictability x Dynamism -35.302 -11.200 24.087
Competitive Predictability x Firm Relatedness 9.970 6.496 9.815
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Observations 168 129 129 129 129 129 129 129
Number of Groups 70 58 58 58 58 58 58 58
Chi-squared 411.1 *** 723.6 *** 990.1 *** 819.7 *** 977.2 *** 825.9 *** 958.9 *** 944 ***
Robust standard errors
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
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Table B3: Dependent Variable Robustness Models 
 
 
DV: Premium 1 Week 1 Day 4 Weeks
Model  1 Model  2 Model  3
Intercept 16.457 28.714 24.409
Target Performance -0.021 0.019 0.044 +
Acquirer Performance 0.084 *** 0.014 0.066 ***
Target Firm Size -10.891 * -9.042 * -12.124 *
Time Since IPO -0.703 1.696 -0.824
Deal Size 8.445 + 4.981 8.776 +
Relative Size -0.770 -4.474 -5.153
Payment Method 6.879 5.577 3.261
Target Investment Advisors 6.052 * 7.579 * 4.028
Acquirer Investment Advisors -3.295 + -4.721 + -2.134
Environmental Munificence 11.496 -13.356 32.460
Environmental Complexity -10.009 -24.010 21.534
High-Tech Industry 23.688 ** 21.051 ** 13.910 +
Competitive Simplicity 39.914 ** 38.007 ** 25.613
Competitive Similarity -27.824 * -11.499 -27.849 *
Competitive Predictability -6.882 -6.328 -9.540 +
Firm Relatedness -0.440 -1.788 0.386
Environmental Dynamism -127.492 -69.315 -149.781
Year Fixed Effects
Observations 129 129 127
Number of Groups 58 58 57
Chi-squared 723.6 *** 176.9 *** 1098.0 ***
Robust Standard errors
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
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Table B4: Overspecification Sensitivity Analyses 
 
DV: Premium
IVs Only
IVs + Year 
Categorical 
Control
"When in 
doubt, leave 
it out"
Full Model 
using Year 
Categorical 
Control
IVs + Year 
Fixed 
Effects
"When in 
doubt, leave 
it out"
Full Model 
using Year 
Fixed 
Effects
Model  1 Model  2 Model  3 Model  4 Model  5 Model  6 Model  7
Intercept 41.378 *** -1,064.408 -1,052.590 -2,439.182 21.810 ** 20.439 16.457
Target Performance -0.008 -0.006 -0.021 -0.021
Acquirer Performance 0.071 *** 0.069 *** 0.083 *** 0.084 ***
Target Firm Size -8.932 * -8.494 + -11.358 ** -10.891 *
Time Since IPO -0.088 -0.703
Deal Size 6.500 7.012 8.937 * 8.445 +
Relative Size -3.287 -0.770
Payment Method 7.762 + 8.792 * 6.600 6.879
Target Investment Advisors 4.091 6.052 *
Acquirer Investment Advisors -3.794 + -3.295 +
Environmental Munificence 48.032 11.496
Environmental Complexity 21.656 -10.009
High-Tech Industry 22.686 ** 26.922 ** 20.516 ** 23.688 **
Competitive Simplicity 27.709 * 28.433 * 31.633 * 34.874 * 32.462 ** 34.358 ** 39.914 **
Competitive Similarity -28.771 -29.397 -25.942 + -25.646 + -29.239 + -31.682 * -27.824 *
Competitive Predictability -9.217 + -9.567 * -8.535 + -7.875 -8.867 -7.616 -6.882
Firm Relatedness 4.348 3.954 0.635 1.206 3.608 -0.121 -0.440
Environmental Dynamism -140.524 -139.895 -133.410 -174.138 -163.159 -137.759 -127.492
Year (1 variable, 2000-2010) 0.552 0.536 1.218
Year Fixed Effects (10 dummies) Included Included Included
Observations 131 131 129 129 131 129 129
Number of Groups 58 58 58 58 58 58 58
Chi-squared 14.4 ** 14.5 * 263.1 *** 310.7 *** 33.3 ** 509.4 *** 723.6 ***
Robust Standard errors
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
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Table B5: Sample Selection Heckman Analyses 
 
HLM 
Model
5th Year 
Variable
5 Year 
Average
Acquisition Premium Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
 Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
 Intercept 34.483 15.712 120.168 40.087
 Target Performance 28.332 26.060 22.108 25.127
 Acquirer Performance 1.066 -2.814 17.571 -2.547
 Target Firm Size -13.636 + -17.018 + -14.030 + -13.182
 Time Since IPO -1.158 22.159 1.098 6.660
 Deal Size 8.384 11.853 9.975 7.531
 Relative Size -0.309 -0.731 -0.357 -0.606
 Payment Method 18.033 + 21.112 * 17.610 * 20.876 *
 Target Investment Advisors 6.393 8.655 5.177 10.234
 Acquirer Investment Advisors -7.280 + -12.731 * -7.171 + -11.174 +
 Environmental Munificence 62.076 42.852 -17.289 52.251
 Environmental Complexity 12.910 23.862 57.959 14.483
 High-Tech Industry 1.064 -26.823 -14.110 -18.137
 Competitive Simplicity 40.129 ** 56.576 70.303 + 53.837
 Competitive Similarity -62.480 + -74.256 ** -54.559 * -77.311 **
 Competitive Predictability -19.064 + -26.322 -22.160 + -24.823
 Firm Relatedness 7.977 5.006 7.555 6.194
 Environmental Dynamism -195.706 -191.726 -192.764 -261.847
Selection Equation Variables
 Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included
 Intercept -7.398 -6.762 -9.743
 Target Performance 0.252 0.100 -0.215
 Target Firm Size -0.001 0.014 0.026
Time Since IPO -1.163 *** -0.060 -0.801 ***
Environmental Munificence 0.965 2.040 ** 1.265
Environmental Complexity -0.947 0.152 -1.185
High-Tech Industry 0.469 + 0.214 1.122 *
Competitive Simplicity 0.391 -1.083 *** 1.219
Competitive Similarity 0.478 -0.372 + 0.791
Competitive Predictability 0.094 0.107 -0.061
Environmental Dynamism 4.869 -1.114 16.588 *
Major Exchange -0.056 0.001 -0.595
Industry M&A Activity 0.000 + 0.000 *** 0.001 +
Mills Lambda -51.159 -45.935 -34.608
Chi-squared 69.7 *** 28.1 31.1 30.0
N 107 939 1,382 199
Non-sample Firms 858 1278 118
Sample Firms 81 104 81
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 HLM using 
Robust Std 
Errors
Two Step Heckman, using Heckman Std 
Errors
Year Prior to 
Acquisition
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Table B6: Sample Selection Heckman Models: Failed vs Completed Acquisitions 
Acquisition Premium Model
 Year Fixed Effects Included Included
 Intercept 35.542 20.919
 Target Performance 0.023 0.006
 Acquirer Performance 0.223 + 0.202
 Target Firm Size -9.153 + -8.100
 Time Since IPO 1.516 -0.661
 Deal Size 3.415 2.650
 Relative Size -6.654 -6.314
 Payment Method 9.700 + 10.630 *
 Target Investment Advisors 9.926 ** 10.702 **
Acquirer Investment Advisors -4.497 -4.778
Environmental Munificence -33.452 -25.120
 Environmental Complexity -37.189 -40.053
 High-Tech Industry 19.679 + 23.737 *
 Competitive Simplicity 51.724 * 64.135 **
 Competitive Similarity -13.098 -17.020
 Competitive Predictability -14.281 + -10.962
 Firm Relatedness -7.182 + -6.858+ +
 Environmental Dynamism -68.517 -58.593
 
Selection Equation Variables
 Year Fixed Effects Included Included
 Intercept 1.467 -1.416
 Target Performance -0.008 -0.004
Target Firm Size -0.021 -0.073
Time Since IPO -0.291 * -0.518 ***
Environmental Munificence 0.950 0.426
Environmental Complexity -0.483 -1.205
High-Tech Industry 0.327 0.296
Competitive Simplicity 1.341 1.730 *
Competitive Similarity -1.542 + -1.079 +
Competitive Predictability 0.557 0.300
Environmental Dynamism 2.118 6.141
Major Exchange 0.739 0.593
Industry M&A Activity -0.000 -0.000
Mills Lambda -17.894 8.836
Chi-squared 47.2 ** 48.9 **
N 118 151
Non-sample Firms 23 56
Sample Firms 95 95
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 Two Step Heckman, using Heckman 
Std Errors
Failed within 5 yrs 
of IPO vs Sample
Model 1
Failed Acquisition 
vs Sample
Model 2
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Table B7: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations using Diversification Firm Relatedness 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
(1) Premium (1 week) 42.49 62.47 1.00
(2) Target Performance -28.81 87.18 -0.04 1.00
(3) Acquirer Performance -14.33 130.62 0.11 0.47 1.00
(4) Target Firm Size 5.32 1.56 -0.18 0.33 0.04 1.00
(5) Time Since IPO 3.13 1.29 -0.07 0.07 0.09 -0.02 1.00
(6) Deal Size 5.50 1.80 -0.07 0.42 0.11 0.74 -0.03 1.00
(7) Relative Size 0.53 1.71 -0.12 0.00 -0.07 0.07 0.03 -0.19 1.00
(8) Payment Method 1.61 1.05 -0.01 -0.13 -0.15 0.11 -0.12 -0.05 0.14 1.00
(9) Target Investment Advisors 2.87 1.54 -0.02 0.22 0.02 0.43 0.00 0.54 -0.09 -0.02 1.00
(10) Acquirer Investment Advisors 2.62 1.86 -0.11 0.25 0.02 0.48 0.02 0.62 -0.10 0.04 0.48 1.00
(11) Environmental Munificence 0.11 0.10 0.03 -0.07 -0.07 0.10 -0.07 -0.01 0.01 0.16 0.13 0.03 1.00
(12) Environmental Complexity 0.20 0.16 -0.07 0.09 0.06 0.05 -0.09 -0.03 0.15 -0.11 -0.11 -0.07 -0.05 1.00
(13) High-Tech Industry 0.57 0.50 0.14 -0.17 -0.08 -0.34 -0.05 -0.08 -0.10 -0.19 -0.01 -0.04 -0.07 -0.24 1.00
(14) Competitive Simplicity 0.86 0.23 0.09 0.01 -0.01 -0.08 0.10 -0.11 0.01 -0.05 -0.13 -0.06 -0.01 0.05 -0.23 1.00
(15) Competitive Similarity 0.66 0.33 -0.13 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.13 0.07 0.06 0.14 -0.06 0.08 0.02 -0.08 -0.04 -0.17 1.00
(16) Competitive Predictability -0.27 0.65 -0.02 0.23 0.06 -0.18 0.08 -0.03 -0.05 -0.20 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 0.08 -0.04 0.47 -0.24 1.00
(17) Firm Relatedness (Diversification) 0.31 0.56 0.26 0.14 0.22 -0.09 0.09 0.15 -0.16 -0.18 -0.10 -0.00 -0.17 -0.09 0.28 0.02 0.02 -0.10 1.00
(18) Environmental Dynamism 0.03 0.03 -0.08 0.12 0.06 0.28 0.09 0.16 0.03 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.12 -0.26 0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.08
Correlations greater than |0.14| are significant at p < 0.05
N=71
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Table B8: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations including Firm Competitive Activity 
 
 
 
 
 Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
(1) Premium (1 week) 42.49 62.47 1.00
(2) Target Performance -28.81 87.18 -0.04 1.00
(3) Acquirer Performance -14.33 130.62 0.11 0.47 1.00
(4) Target Firm Size 5.32 1.56 -0.18 0.33 0.04 1.00
(5) Time Since IPO 3.13 1.29 -0.07 0.07 0.09 -0.02 1.00
(6) Deal Size 5.50 1.80 -0.07 0.42 0.11 0.74 -0.03 1.00
(7) Relative Size 0.53 1.71 -0.12 0.00 -0.07 0.07 0.03 -0.19 1.00
(8) Payment Method 1.61 1.05 -0.01 -0.13 -0.15 0.11 -0.12 -0.05 0.14 1.00
(9) Target Investment Advisors 2.87 1.54 -0.02 0.22 0.02 0.43 0.00 0.54 -0.09 -0.02 1.00
(10) Acquirer Investment Advisors 2.62 1.86 -0.11 0.25 0.02 0.48 0.02 0.62 -0.10 0.04 0.48 1.00
(11) Environmental Munificence 0.11 0.10 0.03 -0.07 -0.07 0.10 -0.07 -0.01 0.01 0.16 0.13 0.03 1.00
(12) Environmental Complexity 0.20 0.16 -0.07 0.09 0.06 0.05 -0.09 -0.03 0.15 -0.11 -0.11 -0.07 -0.05 1.00
(13) High-Tech Industry 0.57 0.50 0.14 -0.17 -0.08 -0.34 -0.05 -0.08 -0.10 -0.19 -0.01 -0.04 -0.07 -0.24 1.00
(14) Firm Competitive Activity 2.54 9.89 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.07 0.13 0.03 -0.09 -0.01 -0.03 1.00
(15) Competitive Simplicity 0.86 0.23 0.09 0.01 -0.01 -0.08 0.10 -0.11 0.01 -0.05 -0.13 -0.06 -0.01 0.05 -0.23 -0.14 1.00
(16) Competitive Similarity 0.66 0.33 -0.13 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.13 0.07 0.06 0.14 -0.06 0.08 0.02 -0.08 -0.04 -0.05 -0.17 1.00
(17) Competitive Predictability -0.27 0.65 -0.02 0.23 0.06 -0.18 0.08 -0.03 -0.05 -0.20 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 0.08 -0.04 -0.27 0.47 -0.24 1.00
(18) Firm Relatedness 1.07 0.99 0.11 -0.07 0.08 -0.13 0.06 -0.16 -0.11 -0.05 -0.08 -0.06 0.01 -0.04 -0.11 0.07 0.11 -0.06 -0.05 1.00
(19) Environmental Dynamism 0.03 0.03 -0.08 0.12 0.06 0.28 0.09 0.16 0.03 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.12 -0.26 0.24 0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05
Correlations greater than |0.13| are significant at p < 0.05
N = 129
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Table B9: HLM Results including Firm Competitive Activity 
 
 
DV: 1 Week Premium
Model  1 Model  2 Model  3
Intercept 64.766 ** 15.561 12.050
Target Performance -0.065 -0.022 -0.035
Acquirer Performance 0.081 *** 0.085 *** 0.097 ***
Target Firm Size -11.285 ** -10.538 * -11.249 *
Time Since IPO -1.680 -0.772 -1.719
Deal Size 6.926 8.311 8.660 +
Relative Size -0.568 -0.578 2.448
Payment Method 0.409 6.792 7.093
Target Investment Advisors 4.415 5.834 5.700 +
Acquirer Investment Advisors -2.241 -3.260 -2.626
Environmental Munificence -0.580 15.349 25.847
Environmental Complexity -31.175 -9.690 -4.658
High-Tech Industry 15.854 * 24.068 ** 26.050 **
Firm Competitive Activity 0.155 0.133 0.525 *
Competitive Simplicity 39.812 ** 35.050 *
Competitive Similarity -27.343 + -27.883 *
Competitive Predictability -6.132 -3.549
Firm Relatedness -0.428 -2.901
Environmental Dynamism -148.847 -279.724 *
Competitive Similarity x Dynamism -91.528
Competitive Similarity x Firm Relatedness -3.433
Competitive Simplicity x Dynamism -864.546 +
Competitive Simplicity x Firm Relatedness -22.090 +
Competitive Predictability x Dynamism 132.125
Competitive Predictability x Firm Relatedness 11.470 +
Year Fixed Effects
Observations 168 129 129
Number of Groups 70 58 58
Chi-squared 447.1 *** 849.1 *** 1555 ***
Robust Standard errors
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
